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  1 
HEALTH CARE AND THE MYTH  
OF SELF-RELIANCE 
NICOLE HUBERFELD* 
JESSICA L. ROBERTS** 
Abstract: King v. Burwell asked the Supreme Court to decide if, in providing 
assistance to purchase insurance “through an Exchange established by the 
State,” Congress meant to subsidize policies bought on the federally run ex-
change. With its ruling, the Court saved the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act’s (“ACA”) low-income subsidy. But King is only part of a longer, 
more complex story about health care access for the poor. In a move toward 
universal coverage, two pillars of the ACA facilitate health insurance coverage 
for low-income Americans, one private and one public: (1) the subsidy and 
(2) Medicaid expansion. Although both have been subject to high-profile Su-
preme Court cases, the Court upheld one but gutted the other. This Article hy-
pothesizes that the preference for private “hidden” government assistance over 
public “visible” government assistance stems from the American myth of self-
reliance. Yet this analysis reveals that the line between hidden and visible bene-
fits breaks down on both theoretical and empirical levels. Drawing from vulner-
ability theory and demographic data, this Article demonstrates that all Ameri-
cans lead subsidized lives and could move from the private to the public system. 
It concludes that a single government program for the poor would be more eco-
nomically and administratively efficient. 
But there is another tradition that we share today. It calls upon us never 
to be indifferent toward despair. It commands us never to turn away 
from helplessness. It directs us never to ignore or to spurn those who 
suffer untended in a land that is bursting with abundance. 
—Lyndon B. Johnson1 
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Dependency is death to initiative, risk-taking and opportunity. Dependen-
cy is culture killing. It’s a drug. We’ve got to fight it like the poison it is. 
—Mitt Romney2 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided King v. Burwell, one of the 
Term’s most-watched cases.3 In what was widely regarded as another at-
tempt to dismantle the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), 
the petitioners challenged the applicability of the statute’s low-income sub-
sidy to health insurance policies purchased on the federally run exchange.4 
To allow low-income Americans to comply with the law’s individual insur-
ance mandate, Congress included a tax credit to purchase subsidized cover-
age for individuals enrolled through an “Exchange established by the 
State.”5 Thirty-four states did not establish their own exchanges, though, 
opting instead to have their residents rely on the insurance exchange run by 
the federal government.6 King therefore came down to simple statutory in-
terpretation: did Congress intend the low-income subsidy to apply only to 
the state exchanges? Although this issue might seem like lawyerly quib-
bling, experts estimated that the insurance coverage of up to thirteen million 
Americans hung in the balance.7 Ultimately, the Court decided in favor of 
the government, rescuing a key feature of the ACA and preserving coverage 
for millions of low-income Americans who purchased insurance through the 
federal marketplace.8 But the low-income subsidy is only part of the ACA’s 
attempt to patch together health insurance coverage for all Americans. 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Remarks at the Signing of the Independence of the 
Medicare Bill (July 30, 1965), in CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS HISTORY PRO-
JECT: PRESIDENTS’ SPEECHES 18, 22 (n.d.), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/
History/downloads/CMSPresidentsSpeeches.pdf [http://perma.cc/XV4G-Z4GJ]. 
 2 Mitt Romney, Former Governor of Mass., Speech at the Conservative Political Action Confer-
ence (Feb. 7, 2008), in Associated Press, Mitt Romney Suspends Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/us/politics/08romney-transcript.html [https://perma.cc/
EH33-BURY]. 
 3 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015); see James Taranto, Opinion, Unconstitu-
tional After All?, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 27, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uncon-
stitutional-after-all-1425072324 (referring to King as one of the Term’s most-watched cases). 
 4 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487–88. 
 5 I.R.C. § 36B (2012); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (discussing tax credit goals of I.R.C. § 36B). 
 6 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487. 
 7 E.g., Drew Altman, How 13 Million Americans Could Lose Insurance Subsidies, WALL 
STREET J.: WASH. WIRE (Nov. 19, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/11/19/
how-13-million-americans-could-lose-insurance-subsidies [https://perma.cc/6CJP-C6EB]. 
 8 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (adopting reading of I.R.C. § 36B that allows the low-income 
subsidy for those who purchased insurance through federal marketplace). 
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Until recently, American health care was grounded in exclusion.9 Peo-
ple who had health insurance could access needed health care and those 
without health insurance often could not. The ACA reversed that norm, es-
pousing a principle of inclusion or “universality” by facilitating universal 
health insurance coverage.10 Populations long excluded from coverage were 
embraced by two pillars of the statute: the low-income subsidy that was 
subject to the challenge in King and Medicaid expansion. Both have been 
subject to high-profile Supreme Court cases. Although the low-income sub-
sidy survived its legal challenge, expanding Medicaid has been a far more 
contentious legal and political issue. 
Congress designed the low-income subsidy and Medicaid to work to-
gether to provide health insurance to poorer Americans. Medicaid would catch 
those individuals who could not afford health insurance but were previously 
ineligible for the program, while tax subsidies would be available to people 
earning too much for Medicaid to assist them with purchasing private health 
insurance on newly created health insurance exchanges.11 If the ACA were 
being measured by lives covered, then this architecture appears to be success-
ful so far, notwithstanding ongoing debate. As of March 20, 2015, the Medi-
caid expansion covered an estimated 11.2 million lives,12 and the private in-
surance available through health insurance exchanges covered an estimated 
eleven million lives, at least 86% of whom qualified for tax credit subsidies.13 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See generally Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 67 (2015) (detailing the fragmented and exclusionary nature of health care in 
the United States). 
 10 The authors have called this important statutory principle “universality” in several prior 
works. See Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, An Empirical Perspective on Medicaid as 
Social Insurance, 46 TOLEDO L. REV. 545, 546 (2015) [hereinafter Huberfeld & Roberts, Empiri-
cal]; Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Medicaid Expansion as Completion of the Great 
Society, 1 ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPS. 1, 2 (2014), http://www.illinoislawreview.org/slip-opinions/
Huberfeld/ [https://perma.cc/7GA5-BMLD] [hereinafter Huberfeld & Roberts, Great Society]; see 
also Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 68. 
 11 RACHEL GARFIELD & ANTHONY DAMICO, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE COVERAGE GAP: 
UNINSURED POOR ADULTS IN STATES THAT DO NOT EXPAND MEDICAID—AN UPDATE 1 (2015), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-
do-not-expand-medicaid-an-update [https://perma.cc/E2N7-CZS5]. 
 12 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID ENROLLMENT AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2015), http://aspe.
hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/139236/ib_MedicaidEnrollment.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K2J-AENG]. 
 13 Matthew Buettgens et al., Marketplaces Make Significant Progress in 2015, URBAN INST., 
http://datatools.urban.org/features/marketplace-enrollment [https://perma.cc/8L7C-BJ2U] (last up-
dated Apr. 8, 2015) (projecting eleven million enrollees at the end of 2015 open enrollment); Rob-
ert Pear, 86 Percent of Health Law Enrollees Receive Subsidies, White House Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/us/11-7-million-americans-have-insurance-
under-health-act.html [https://perma.cc/7QJX-NBWP]. If the measure is premiums paid, a more 
recent report indicates that about 10.2 million lives were covered as of the end of March 2015. See 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., March Effectuated Enrollment Consistent 
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After the first round of enrollment under the ACA, approximately twenty mil-
lion Americans gained health insurance that would have otherwise been unat-
tainable,14 and that number appears to be even larger after the second round 
of enrollment.15 According to a Gallup analysis, uninsured rates in the first 
half of 2015 were the lowest they have been since 2008, at 11.4%, and the 
National Health Interview Survey indicated the rate of uninsurance was 9% 
of the population as of June 2015.16 
The Medicaid expansion, though, has generated ongoing friction and 
negotiation within state political branches, as well as between the states and 
the federal government.17 When the Supreme Court left the decision to ex-
pand Medicaid to the states in the 2012 case National Federation of Inde-
                                                                                                                           
with Department’s 2015 Goal: Nearly 8.7 Million People Nationwide Received an Average Tax 
Credit of $272 per Month to Make Their Health Coverage More Affordable (June 2, 2015), http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015pres/06/20150602a.html [https://perma.cc/5RB2-B2FE] (indicating 
10.2 million persons had “paid for [m]arketplace coverage and still ha[d] an active policy” on 
March 31, 2015). 
 14 David Blumenthal & Sara R. Collins, Health Care Coverage Under the Affordable Care 
Act—A Progress Report, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 275, 280 (2014). 
 15 See id. at 277–78 (reporting eight million total enrollees through all marketplaces as of May 
1, 2014); OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES 2015 OPEN ENROLLMENT 
PERIOD: MARCH ENROLLMENT REPORT 1 (2015), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
83656/ib_2015mar_enrollment.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT94-GB6Z] (reporting nearly 11.7 million 
total enrollees through all marketplaces as of February 22, 2015). 
 16 MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ & ROBIN A. COHEN, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL 
HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY–JUNE 2015, at 1 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nhis/earlyrelease/insur201511.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UFF-F3SF] (calculating uninsurance rates 
based on a poll of 54,097 individuals); Stephanie Marken, U.S. Uninsured Rate at 11.4% in Second 
Quarter, GALLUP (July 10, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/184064/uninsured-rate-second-
quarter.aspx [https://perma.cc/98UF-Q8DX] (reporting uninsurance rates based on a poll of 
44,000 people over three months in 2015). Both reports are reliable, but the Centers for Disease 
Control (“CDC”) estimate probably is more accurate because it relies on extensive Census Bureau 
data that are collected from all members of a household on a monthly basis rather than the single 
data point collection by a phone call performed by Gallup. CDC also measures health insurance 
coverage across three different time measures to account for the fluctuation in coverage that oc-
curs regularly, especially among low-income populations. See MARTINEZ & COHEN, supra, at 9. 
 17 See, e.g., Josh Barro & Margot Sanger-Katz, Election Will Leave Medicaid Policies Large-
ly Unchanged, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/
upshot/election-results-2014-the-effect-on-medicaid-expansion.html [https://perma.cc/L7SC-ZCDY]; 
Jason Millman, The Election Might Keep Millions of People from Getting Health Insurance, 
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2014/11/05/the-election-might-keep-millions-of-people-from-getting-health-insurance [https://
perma.cc/C6PB-RFHP]; Sam Stein & Jeffrey Young, Medicaid Expansion for Millions Hinges on 
Key Governors’ Races, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2014, 10:59 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/11/04/medicaid-expansion-governors_n_6097024.html [https://perma.cc/LK83-
RPDB]; John Tozzi, Another Election Loser: Obamacare’s Medicaid Expansion, BUSINESSWEEK 
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-11-05/another-midtern-election-loser-
obamacares-medicaid-expansion [https://perma.cc/4S3C-9JPP]. 
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pendent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB”),18 many state politicians denounced 
expanding the program in an effort to solidify their political positions and to 
distance themselves from both health care reform and President Obama.19 
Opponents of Medicaid expansion openly declared that providing health 
care to the “able-bodied” poor could encourage dependency, leading to an-
tagonism toward Medicaid expansion in particular.20 In this rhetoric, politi-
cians implicitly employ an ideal of self-reliance, a value long embedded in 
the American political psyche.21 According to this widely held belief, any 
help from the government entails dependency, which conflicts with the ide-
als of freedom and self-sufficiency.22 Because autonomy has been a central 
value in American political culture, individuals who rely on state assistance 
face stigma labeling them as “dependent and failures.”23 
Those who oppose Medicaid expansion have capitalized on this trope, 
arguing that the program hurts, rather than helps, its beneficiaries and cre-
                                                                                                                           
 18 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 19 For a review of the reasons not to expand Medicaid cited by governors, see generally Ben-
jamin D. Sommers & Arnold M. Epstein, U.S. Governors and the Medicaid Expansion—No Quick 
Resolution in Sight, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 496 (2013). Not all Republican governors opposed 
Medicaid expansion in their states. Id. at 497. Eight states with Republican leadership agreed to 
the expansion. Id. For a deeper exploration of states’ decisions to expand Medicaid eligibility, 
juxtaposed with their decisions regarding health insurance exchanges, see generally Tom Baker et 
al., The New Health Care Federalism: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Federalism 
Dynamics in Health Care and Beyond (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-
34, Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 525, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2511003 
[https://perma.cc/Y4YL-RN4S]. 
 20 See, e.g., Gray Rohrer, House Kills Senate’s Health Care Expansion, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
(June 5, 2015, 8:23 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/politics/os-special-session-day-
five-20150605-story.html [https://perma.cc/KBT5-JKZK] (“Opponents objected to the [Medicaid] 
bill because it relied too much on federal funds and would expand coverage to what they called 
‘single, able-bodied adults.’”). 
 21 See, e.g., HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Resistance to Civil Government, in WALDEN AND RE-
SISTANCE TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT 226 (William Rossi ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2d ed. 1992) 
(1849). This essay produced such well-known thoughts as: “That government is best which gov-
erns not at all,” id., “For government is an expedient by which men would fain succeed in letting 
one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is most expedient, the governed are most let 
alone by it,” id. at 227, “The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited 
monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. . . . There will 
never be a really free and enlightened State, until the State comes to recognize the individual as a 
higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats 
him accordingly,” id. at 245. Some perceive this not as anti-government but anti- “unjust” gov-
ernment. See, e.g., AARON BARLOW, THE CULT OF INDIVIDUALISM 138–39 (2013) (discussing 
Thoreau’s essay as a contemplation of the role of government in supporting the individual). 
 22 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY 
L.J. 251, 258–59, 258 n.26 (2011) (“The importance of the idea of independence to the construc-
tion of an autonomous and equal individual may be traced to the fact that the very existence of the 
United States begins with a document entitled ‘The Declaration of Independence.’”). 
 23 Id. at 259. 
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ates a socially undesirable state of dependency.24 In states that have already 
expanded Medicaid, politicians have sought ways to link Medicaid to work 
requirements,25 even though Medicaid was delinked from welfare in 1996 
and two-thirds of the people who qualify for expansion have at least one 
worker in the household.26 In their rhetoric and proposed policies, politi-
cians have therefore mirrored many either-or dichotomies associated with 
the American myth of self-reliance, such as construing individuals as either 
workers or paupers who either work or receive benefits, respectively. 
Exclusionary policymaking is nothing new,27 but undermining the 
ACA’s attempt at universal coverage has substantial consequences beyond 
grandiloquence. The reluctance of some states to expand Medicaid has led 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Sommers & Epstein, supra note 19, at 498 (“For instance, Dennis Daugaard (R-SD) de-
clared that ‘able-bodied adults should be self-reliant’—in contrast to children or people with disabili-
ties, the traditional Medicaid beneficiaries.”); see also Tara Culp-Ressler, Scott Walker: Denying 
Health Care to Low-Income People Helps Them ‘Live the American Dream,’ THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 
14, 2014, 11:18 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/11/14/3592511/scott-walker-medicaid-
expansion [https://perma.cc/L5JR-KFPX] (“Wisconsin Gov[ernor] Scott Walker (R) on Friday 
suggested that denying health coverage to additional low-income Americans helps more people 
‘live the American Dream’ because they won’t be ‘dependent on the American government.’”); 
Brendan Kirby, Governor Bentley Offers Unapologetic Defense of Decision to Reject Medicaid 
Expansion, AL.COM: BLOG (Jan. 14, 2014, 8:35 PM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2014/01/governor_
bentley_offers_unapol.html [https://perma.cc/E6P6-QTW7] (quoting Governor Robert Bentley of 
Alabama as saying “[a]nd under Obamacare, Medicaid would grow even larger—bringing mil-
lions more people to a state of dependency on government”). 
 25 The first state to seek a Medicaid-work linkage in its expansion waiver was Pennsylvania. 
Associated Press, Pennsylvania Awaits Ruling on Proposal to Link Work Requirements to Medi-
caid Benefits, PBS NEWS HOUR (Apr. 27, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
rundown/pennsylvania-awaits-ruling-proposal-link-work-requirements-medicaid-benefits [https://
perma.cc/W28R-DGXA]. Even though the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) rejected the linkage between work and Medicaid, other states have continued to push it; 
for example, Missouri’s Governor touted work requirements while considering expansion. Jordan 
Shapiro, Missouri Gov. Endorses Work Requirement as Part of Medicaid Expansion Plan, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 12, 2015), http://khn.org/news/missouri-gov-endorses-work-requirement-as-
part-of-medicaid-expansion-plan [https://perma.cc/MKC4-8MBH]; see also Letter from Marilyn 
Tavenner, Office of the Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Beverly Mackereth, 
Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare 2 (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-
Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/pa/pa-healthy-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R6P7-VWPJ] (approving a demonstration waiver but not work requirements related to Medicaid 
expansion). Most recently, Montana expanded its Medicaid program through a § 1115 waiver, and 
it included job training (but not work requirements per se) in the rules for newly eligible enrollees. 
Sanjay Talwani, Montana Medicaid Expansion Earns Key Federal Approval, KRTV.COM (Nov. 
2, 2015, 7:44 PM), http://www.krtv.com/story/30414878/montana-medicaid-expansion-earns-key-
federal-approval [https://perma.cc/5FVL-MKPB]. 
 26 KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY 
FACTS ABOUT THE UNINSURED POPULATION 5 fig.4 (2014), http://files.kff.org/attachment/key-
facts-about-the-uninsured-population-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/LRU4-95BR] [hereinafter KEY 
FACTS ABOUT THE UNINSURED] (noting that in 2013, 71% of nonelderly uninsured households 
had one or more full-time workers). 
 27 See generally Huberfeld, supra note 9 (discussing exclusionary practices in health care). 
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to an insurance coverage gap for individuals who make too much to be eli-
gible for a non-expanded Medicaid program yet not enough to qualify for 
the ACA’s premium assistance tax subsidies—what one of the authors has 
dubbed the problem of the penultimate poor.28 As a result of states’ opting 
out of the expansion, more than six million people are not eligible for Med-
icaid.29 
In contrast, hidden government assistance—which is to say, subsidies 
funneled through the tax system—invites far less of what this Article will 
call “self-reliance scrutiny” than visible public assistance. Tax-free employ-
er-provided benefits are rarely discussed as a government subsidy for pur-
chasing health insurance.30 Likewise, the ACA’s low-income subsidy has 
garnered far less criticism than Medicaid expansion. In fact, Congress de-
signed the ACA to push most people into private insurance—even when 
that insurance is highly subsidized by the government—because it seems 
more politically desirable.31 Yet despite their perceived differences, Medi-
caid and the low-income subsidy are substantially similar in nature. They 
are both government programs designed to secure health insurance for low-
to-middle income individuals with minimal cost-sharing for those who are 
too poor to buy into the system. 
Despite the vitriol directed at Medicaid and the relative acceptance of 
the low-income subsidy, both government programs serve largely the same 
populations. This Article argues that Medicaid expansion and the low-income 
subsidy are effectively the same: they have similar goals and operate in sim-
                                                                                                                           
 28 See Garfield & Damico, supra note 11 (discussing the coverage gap); Nicole Huberfeld, Pe-
nultimate Poor and the Individual Mandate, HEALTHLAWPROF BLOG (Jan. 31, 2013), http://law
professors.typepad.com/healthlawprof_blog/2013/01/penultimate-poor-and-the-individual-mandate.
html [https://perma.cc/LY3A-HYB4]. 
 29 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 3 (2012), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.
pdf [https://perma.cc/HF3U-2DEG]. 
 30 See Joseph Antos, Opinion, End the Exemption for Employer-Provided Health Care, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015, 6:45 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/14/the-worst-
tax-breaks/end-the-exemption-for-employer-provided-health-care [https://perma.cc/P5QL-DP3L]. 
As one scholar explained, 
The largest tax break in the federal tax code is a stealth subsidy that is both unfair 
and inefficient. Premiums paid for employer-sponsored health insurance are exclud-
ed from taxable income, reducing the amount workers owe in income and payroll 
taxes by about $250 billion annually. In effect, the exclusion is the third largest 
health program after Medicare and Medicaid, yet it has been largely ignored as 
Congress has tried to rein in federal health spending. 
Id. 
 31 PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION 20–21, 194 (rev. ed. 2013) (describing the choice 
to build health care reform on private insurance coverage). 
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ilar ways. First, this Article disputes, on a theoretical level, the American 
myth of self-reliance and the perceived divide between good citizens with 
private insurance and socially undesirable dependents with public benefits. 
Vulnerability theory challenges the notion that human beings are autono-
mous, independent actors, instead arguing that we are all susceptible to ill-
ness, injury, and disability.32 Viewed through this lens, the Medicaid expan-
sion and the low-income subsidy are examples of the state responding to the 
same universal needs of its citizens. Next, this Article challenges the divid-
ing line between visible and hidden government assistance on a practical 
level. Research indicates that, under the current system, the same individu-
als bounce back and forth between the public and private systems. In fact, 
the difference between being labeled a socially undesirable dependent who 
must rely on Medicaid and a good working citizen who purchases private—
albeit highly subsidized—coverage can be as little as a few days of pay per 
year. Hence, this Article asserts that no principled, meaningful difference 
exists between government assistance in health insurance via a visible bene-
fit, like Medicaid, and government assistance in health insurance via a hid-
den benefit, like the low-income subsidy. 
Having demonstrated that the line between hidden and visible benefits 
is both theoretically and empirically unsound, this Article contemplates a 
unified government program for providing health insurance for low-income 
Americans. Not only would a single system break down some of the stigma 
associated with dependency, it would also be more financially and adminis-
tratively efficient, as individuals would no longer need to cycle between 
public and private benefits. Importantly, this Article does not answer the 
question of whether Medicaid and the low-income subsidies create econom-
ic dependence or facilitate economic independence. That question is better 
left to social scientists and economists.33 Instead, this Article simply argues 
that a single benefits system for low-income individuals—whether Medi-
caid-based or subsidy-based—would have meaningful social and practical 
benefits. 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See infra notes 188–269 and accompanying text (examining vulnerability theory and what 
it can teach about the flawed dichotomy between dependence and self-reliance). 
 33 Research finds that social insurance programs facilitate financial independence for benefi-
ciaries as well as tax benefits for government. See generally, e.g., David W. Brown et al., Medi-
caid as an Investment in Children: What Is the Long-Term Impact on Tax Receipts? (Nat’l Bureau 
for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20,835, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20835.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XMR-N2EB] (discussing Medicaid’s significant long term economic benefits 
for beneficiaries and for the government); Laura R. Wherry et al., Childhood Medicaid Coverage 
and Later Life Health Care Utilization (Nat’l Bureau for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
20,929, 2015), http://harris.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/WherryMillerKaestnerMeyer_9-25-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/84XY-4T4Y] (finding that extended coverage for children under Medi-
caid’s 1983 amendments correlated with lower medical utilization as adults). 
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I considers the history of exclu-
sion in American health care that led to our divided system of government 
assistance, made up of highly visible direct funding and hidden tax subsi-
dies.34 This Part asserts that despite their substantive similarities, one has 
been stigmatized while the other has not. Part II outlines the American myth 
of self-reliance and its associated assumptions and dichotomies, demonstrat-
ing how the division between visible and hidden government benefits for 
health insurance parallels those dyads.35 Part II goes on to debunk the myth of 
self-reliance, both theoretically and empirically, arguing that the dividing line 
explored in Part I is unprincipled at best and harmful at worst. Finally, Part III 
concludes that it would be more efficient both economically and administra-
tively for individuals to be covered by one program, contrary to the current 
structure of the law, which facilitates needless bouncing between two uncon-
nected and complex systems for people in already fragile circumstances.36 
Part III considers possibilities for unified coverage, exploring the benefits and 
drawbacks of either an all-subsidy program or an all-Medicaid program in 
light of the principle of universality. 
I. DIVIDED GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE IN HEALTH CARE 
This Part presents the origins of our divided system of visible and hid-
den government assistance in health insurance. Despite the substantial simi-
larities between these two kinds of government aid, one is highly stigma-
tized while the other is socially and politically accepted. The dividing line 
between visible public health insurance and hidden subsidies in private 
health insurance has facilitated a story of self-reliance for people who are in 
the private market, and that dividing line remains powerful even in the new 
era of universality in health insurance access and coverage. This Part will 
explore the visible and hidden supports for health insurance access and the 
narratives regarding self-reliance that they have encouraged over time. 
A. Visible Government Assistance 
Direct federal funding is the most familiar form of government assis-
tance because it is the most visible. The federal government has created var-
ious medical safety net programs since the New Deal, and today every 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See infra notes 37–104 and accompanying text (examining the historical development of 
the current bifurcated government assistance systems). 
 35 See infra notes 105–270 and accompanying text (exploring current government supports for 
health insurance in light of the self-reliance myth and vulnerability theory). 
 36 See infra notes 271–320 and accompanying text (advocating a move to one healthcare-
support system and exploring possibilities therefor). 
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American has a family member, friend, or coworker who benefits from 
them, particularly Medicare and Medicaid. Although Medicare, Medicaid, 
and other more minor federal health care programs are not cohesive as a 
cohort of federal statutes,37 they still manage to cover a significant portion 
of the American population’s health care needs. Combined, Medicare and 
Medicaid cover 37% of the nation’s total population, 43% of the insured 
population,38 and represent approximately 35% of national health expendi-
tures.39 Medicaid now covers more insureds than Medicare, at nearly 71 
million lives and 16% of national health expenditures,40 whereas Medicare 
covers 55 million lives (46.3 million elderly and 9 million people with disa-
bilities) and accounts for approximately 22% of national health expendi-
tures.41 Each program is worth considering in its own right and in compari-
son to the other. 
Medicare is a national social insurance program that covers people 
aged sixty-five and over and those who are permanently disabled, regard-
less of their wealth, state of residence, or other status.42 Impoverishment of 
the elderly was commonplace by the 1950s; by attacking the risk represent-
ed by that basic, economic measure from its passage in 1965 until today, 
Medicare has been demonstrably successful in lifting most of our elderly 
population out of poverty caused by medical expenses.43 Despite being the 
closest thing Americans have to the oft-vilified “socialized medicine,” Med-
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Abbe R. Gluck, Symposium Issue Introduction: The Law of Medicare and Medicaid at 
Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 16 (2015) (suggesting that Congress’s committee 
structure may be responsible for this lack of coherence). 
 38 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
FISCAL YEAR 2014 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 2, http://
www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2014-CJ-Final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/XU2P-N2VP] (stating Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance 
Program cover 116 million beneficiaries). 
 39 See NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
NHE-Fact-Sheet.html [https://perma.cc/TL34-RTG8] (last updated July 28, 2015). National 
Health Expenditure data indicate that as of 2013, Medicare paid 20% of national health expendi-
tures and Medicaid paid 15%, but that includes the states’ contribution to Medicaid funding. Id. 
 40 JULIA PARADISE, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID MOVING FORWARD 1 (2015), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-medicaid-moving-forward [https://perma.cc/62KD-SYTL]. 
 41 JULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A PRIMER ON MEDICARE 1 (2015), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-a-primer-on-medicare-key-facts-about-the-medicare-program-
and-the-people-it-covers [https://perma.cc/59AS-8HP4] (number of lives covered); id. at 30 fig.26 
(percentage of national health expenditures). 
 42 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012) (establishing eligibility criteria for Medicare’s hospital and hos-
pice care provisions). 
 43 Ezekiel Emanuel, Symposium Keynote Speech, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 27, 
30 (2015) (“[I]n 1964, just about 30% of the elderly were living in poverty . . . , even with Social 
Security . . . . [W]ith the combination of Medicare and the increases in Social Security, . . . 9% of 
the elderly are in poverty. It is the lowest demographic in the United States in poverty.”). 
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icare is also politically popular.44 In fact, Congress intentionally removed 
medical care for the elderly from welfare-based state control due to effec-
tive lobbying by the elderly, who argued that they should not be subject to 
the whims of states’ welfare-oriented programming, which was often finan-
cially inconsistent and sometimes punitive in attitude.45 Medicare thus cre-
ated a national, universal approach to insuring the elderly by recognizing 
the commonly shared risk related to vulnerability in old age and creating a 
program that would respond at a low cost to beneficiaries’ medical needs. 
Medicare’s universal approach does not allow for stigma. In part, this 
may result from the fact that people must have paid work-related taxes for 
forty quarters in order to automatically qualify for Medicare Part A at age 
sixty-five.46 For all of its universalism, Medicare is still a work-related pro-
gram.47 But it also draws on the public’s understanding and hope that all of us 
will become elderly, and none of us want to be impoverished when that day 
comes. Medicare draws on a principle of solidarity, the polar opposite of 
stigma, in addition to universality. In its inclusive approach to medical care, 
Medicare could be viewed as an exceptional program in America’s panthe-
on of health care legislation and policy, which typically has drawn on the 
American ideal of self-reliance to create limited, non-universal benefits, 
discussed in the context of Medicaid below. 
In contrast, Congress designed Medicaid to facilitate health care access 
for specific groups deemed worthy of public assistance.48 Medicaid was 
enacted with the same pen stroke as Medicare, but the two programs are 
structurally and politically dissimilar. Medicare is administered and funded 
entirely by the federal government (with the help of regional private con-
tractors), and it is structured as federal spending subject to federal policy. In 
                                                                                                                           
 44 The American Medical Association (“AMA”) and free-market-oriented politicians always 
have challenged health care reform that would cover more of the population with government 
assistance by issuing the rallying cry of “socialized medicine.” See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS & 
ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 52 (1974) (describing fear that Medicaid 
would establish “socialized medicine”); Am. Med. Ass’n, Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against 
Socialized Medicine, YOUTUBE (Aug. 1, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRdLpem-
AAs (initially distributed by AMA in 1961 to rally opposition to Medicare by decrying socialized 
medicine). See generally STARR, supra note 31 (recounting the AMA’s fight against health care 
reform through the twentieth century and up to the passage of the ACA).  
 45 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 44, at 45–47 (describing various predecessors and 
contemporary counterproposals to Medicare). 
 46 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (granting Medicare eligibility to, among others, those age sixty-five 
or over who are eligible for Social Security). 
 47 Those who do not meet the forty-quarter minimum can purchase Part A coverage upon 
turning sixty-five, but the point remains the same—America’s social insurance is still a program 
for those who have played by the rule of self-sufficiency by working. 
 48 See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 432 (2011) (de-
scribing Medicaid as “the caboose to Medicare’s train”). 
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contrast, Medicaid has been considered a quintessential cooperative federal-
ism program, a joint state-federal endeavor, underwritten and designed by 
the federal government but administered by each state with some state fund-
ing as well as state options to expand the program beyond the federal mini-
mum requirements.49 
Medicaid differs dramatically from Medicare not only from govern-
ance and funding perspectives but also in the principles the program histori-
cally embodied. When Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965, the program 
covered only the “deserving poor,” meaning the elderly, disabled, pregnant 
women, and children.50 The original Medicaid eligibility rules reflected the 
Elizabethan notion that only those blameless for their circumstances were 
worthy of aid.51 The deserving poor were not deemed to be culpable for 
their inability to care for themselves and, consequently, were “deserving” of 
government assistance.52 Not surprisingly, Medicaid did not render eligible 
childless, non-disabled, working-age adults.53 
The idea that social policies should discourage dependence is nothing 
new; self-reliance is a long-standing American ideal, as discussed at greater 
length in Part II.54 The narrative of dependence as culturally undesirable is 
so strong, though, that at the same time “deserving” status rendered Medi-
caid enrollees worthy of redistributive federal assistance, it imposed stigma 
even beyond that typically attributable to poverty. 
Further, states’ fiscal policies have facilitated the prejudice Medicaid 
enrollees have faced. Historic efforts to address poverty through responsive 
governmental support show that states consistently have underfunded pro-
grams designed to assist the poor.55 In the case of Medicaid, this has meant 
                                                                                                                           
 49 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a–1396f (2012) (establishing a federalist structure in part through fund-
ing from Comptroller General of the United States and review of state policies). 
 50 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 44, at 8, 24, 51–53 (discussing the formation of Medi-
caid). 
 51 Huberfeld, supra note 48, at 439–40 (describing the evolution of the concept of the “de-
serving poor”). 
 52 Id. at 439 (stating that “[c]ertain categories of blameless or ‘deserving’ poor have been 
assisted by local, state, or federal government since the turn of the twentieth century”). 
 53 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 44, at 57 (describing those eligible for Medicaid as 
“families with dependent children and . . . aged, blind or permanently disabled individuals [unable 
to afford medical care]”). 
 54 See infra notes 105–187 and accompanying text (examining self-reliance as an enduring 
American mythological ideal). 
 55 See generally Theda Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to 
Combat Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411 (Christopher Jencks & 
Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (discussing how many major government efforts to combat poverty 
have faltered). 
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low funding that leads to below-norm payment rates for providers.56 Low 
reimbursement rates have a signaling effect, hinting that states view these 
patients as not warranting health care providers’ full efforts. Low payment 
in Medicaid is, like other welfare programs, a remnant of the Elizabethan 
fear of prolonged dependence and permanent pauperism. It also reflected 
fear southern states expressed in the passage of the Social Security Act and 
subsequent related programs that poor African-Americans would rely on 
states for support and that the federal money supporting them would expe-
dite desegregation.57 For these and other reasons, welfare programs have 
long been underfunded in the United States, and that underfunding has con-
tributed to Medicaid’s stigma.58 
Fast forward to the ACA, in which Congress created a universal insur-
ance coverage architecture that expanded Medicaid eligibility and promised 
states generous funding for the newly eligible population’s entry into Medi-
caid.59 More specifically, the ACA mandated expansion of Medicaid eligi-
bility to all adults under age sixty-five with incomes up to 133% of the fed-
eral poverty level (“FPL”).60 For the first time, the expansion includes non-
disabled, non-elderly, childless adults in Medicaid. The federal government 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Nicole Huberfeld, The Supreme Court Ruling That Blocked Providers from Seeking Higher 
Medicaid Payments Also Undercut the Entire Program, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1156, 1157 (2015) (dis-
cussing Medicaid’s historic low payment and its potential effect on the success of expansion). 
 57 EDWIN E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 143–44 (1962). 
Witte wrote: 
Title I of the original bill was very bitterly attacked, particularly by Senator Byrd, on 
the score that it vested in a federal department the power to dictate to the states to 
whom pensions should be paid and how much. In this position, Senator Byrd was 
supported by nearly all of the southern members of both committees, it being very 
evident that at least some southern senators feared that this measure might serve as 
an entering wedge for federal interference with the handling of the Negro question 
in the South. The southern members did not want to give authority to anyone in 
Washington to deny aid to any state because it discriminated against Negroes in the 
administration of old age assistance. 
Id. 
 58 See generally DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY 
1965–2007 (2008) (highlighting historical biases, legislation, and policies that contribute to Medi-
caid’s stigma, as expressed in underfunding and other programmatic weaknesses). 
 59 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 18, 20–21, 25–26, 28–31, 35, 42 (2012)). 
Congress amended the ACA immediately by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010 (“HCERA”), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. 
tits. 20, 26, 42 (2012)). This Article refers to the two Acts collectively as the ACA. 
 60 ACA § 2001, 124 Stat. at 271. As modified by the HCERA, the Medicaid expansion in-
cludes individuals earning up to 138% of the FPL due to a 5% income disregard. HCERA 
§ 1004(e), 124 Stat. at 1036. This Article accounts for this adjustment by referring to the expan-
sion level as 138% of the FPL. 
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completely funds the expansion through 2017, gradually decreasing the fed-
eral match to 90% by 2020 (the “supermatch”). Even when reduced in 
2020, the supermatch is greater than the Medicaid funding states have re-
ceived historically, which is tied to per capita income and ranges from no 
less than 50% to approximately 78% federal funding on the state dollar. 
Nearly one in four Americans will have medical care and costs covered 
by the Medicaid program when it has been fully expanded pursuant to the 
ACA.61 The Medicaid expansion responded to America’s high levels of un-
insurance (more than one-fifth of the population when the ACA was passed) 
as well as the fact that most of the uninsured were low-income working 
poor who either were not offered health insurance as an employment benefit 
or were offered health insurance that is unaffordable. As with past Medicaid 
amendments, this expansion responded to state inability (or unwillingness) 
to cover low-income citizens who needed consistent access to health care. 
The promise of full federal funding for the newly eligible population 
enticed some states to expand their Medicaid programs; however, half of the 
states challenged the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion, resulting 
in the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB.62 That judgment gave states the 
power to ignore the ACA’s mandated Medicaid expansion without other 
penalties, effectively rendering the Medicaid expansion optional by limiting 
the Federal Department of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) ability to 
enforce its own statute. To date, thirty states and the District of Columbia 
have decided to participate in expansion. The remaining states are more slow-
ly negotiating their expansions internally and through the waiver process 
with HHS. 
The ACA rejected Medicaid’s exclusionary approach to health care 
coverage, but NFIB-empowered states are resisting the principle of univer-
sality in their discussions with HHS.63 State politicians have displayed reti-
cence to opt into Medicaid expansion based on bias against those historical-
ly deemed unworthy of governmental assistance, mainly the “able-bodied” 
poor. Some examples of this bias have included: “It was never designed to 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 TO 2024, at 58 
(2014), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45010-Outlook2014_Feb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R4PZ-35EK] (projecting enrollment of eighty-nine million individuals in Medi-
caid by 2024). 
 62 132 S. Ct. at 2580, 2581, 2606–07. Twenty-six states challenged the Affordable Care Act. 
Id. at 2580. These challengers specifically questioned the Medicaid expansion. Id. at 2581. Even-
tually the Court’s decision severely limited the power of the Medicaid expansion. See id. at 2606–
07. 
 63 Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 85. 
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be there for able-bodied adults.”64 “[Medicaid] creates a new welfare enti-
tlement system for able-bodied working adults.”65 “I’d rather find a way, 
particularly for able-bodied adults without children, . . . to get them into the 
workforce.”66 And, most recently, regarding failed legislation in Florida, 
“Opponents objected to the bill because it relied too much on federal funds 
and would expand coverage to what they called ‘single, able-bodied 
adults.’”67 
Additionally, state politicians have expressed concern that Medicaid 
expansion will lead to “dependency” (ostensibly rather than working). Poli-
ticians have stated, for example: “We can break the cycle of poverty, but not 
with programs that drag our communities and our people into the downward 
spiral of dependence,”68 and, “Imagine what we could do if we took a good 
chunk of that money and put it toward job training.”69 Part II demonstrates 
that this perception of low-income Americans who need health insurance as 
non-workers is measurably false, but these statements still matter. Although 
on the surface they appear to be political theater in the name of American 
individualism,70 this viewpoint is being incorporated into Republican pro-
posals for variations on the Medicaid expansion. Some red states have tried 
to include work requirements in their expansion negotiations and plans. 
HHS cannot approve the incorporation of work requirements into a § 1115 
waiver for Medicaid expansion because it is unrelated to the Medicaid Act’s 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Greg Richter, Bobby Jindal: Medicaid Expansion Robs People of Private Insurance, 
NEWSMAX (Nov. 16, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/bobby-jindal-
medicaid-insurance-private/2014/11/16/id/607634 [https://perma.cc/5UPG-QJCF] (reporting re-
marks of Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana on “Meet the Press”). 
 65 Laura Vozzella, Va. House GOP Budget Plan to Include Health Funds for Mentally Ill, 
Poor, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/va-
house-gop-budget-plan-to-include-health-funds-for-mentally-ill-poor/2015/02/05/84d14a0a-ad62-
11e4-9c91-e9d2f9fde644_story.html [https://perma.cc/MW76-43EQ] (quoting remarks of Steve 
Landes, Vice Chairman of Appropriations Committee of Virginia House of Delegates). 
 66 Sarah Ferris, Gov. Walker Faces Growing Pressure Over Medicaid Expansion, THE HILL 
(Feb. 17, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/232962-new-medicaid-cost-estimates-
add-pressure-to-scott-walker [https://perma.cc/NK2D-LFXH] (reporting remarks by Governor Scott 
Walker of Wisconsin). 
 67 Rohrer, supra note 20 (quoting multiple legislative opponents of a bill that would have 
accepted the Medicaid expansion). 
 68 Robert Bentley, Governor of Ala., State of the State Address (Jan. 14, 2014), http://
governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2014/01/governor-bentleys-2014-state-state-address [https://perma.
cc/346P-DN34]. 
 69 Medicaid Redesign Proposal Stalls, UNICAMERAL UPDATE (Apr. 9, 2015), http://update.
legislature.ne.gov/?p=17048 [https://perma.cc/KY5W-K6HG] (quoting State Senator Beau McCoy 
in the Nebraska legislative session). 
 70 See David W. Johnson & Nancy M. Kane, The U.S. Healthcare System: A Product of 
American History and Values, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 323 (Einer R. 
Elhauge ed., 2010) (discussing the role of American individualism in the health care system as a 
whole). 
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provision of “medical assistance,” yet some states are still considering their 
own side-along work requirements for the newly eligible Medicaid popula-
tion.71 
Even though Medicaid was decoupled from welfare in 1996, the ex-
pansion’s universality is being distorted into a return to castigatory welfare-
style requirements. The work and dependency rhetoric draw heavily on the 
myth of self-reliance, as discussed in Part II. Although the ACA rejected the 
notion that only some individuals are worthy of assistance in its universal-
ism, states are reintroducing that narrative thanks to NFIB.72 This trend 
stands in sharp contrast to the indirectly funded, employer-based, private 
health insurance system, discussed next in section B. 
B. Hidden Government Assistance 
Unlike the disdain for the visible assistance described above, private 
insurance coverage has carried an air of belonging and acceptance; people 
with private health insurance most often obtain it through their employers, 
an arrangement encouraged through longstanding federal tax subsidies to 
both employers and employees. In many ways, private insurance connotes 
playing by the rules, while public insurance (except for Medicare) connotes 
shirking. 
Although programs like Medicare and Medicaid appear to be paradig-
matic government-assisted health insurance, federal tax policy has enabled 
broad access to health insurance coverage for decades, and for a large por-
tion of the population, albeit indirectly through employer-based health in-
surance benefits. The hidden nature of tax benefits, in addition to the narra-
tive that people who purchase private insurance are self-reliant, has ren-
dered this form of subsidy for private health insurance less politically 
charged. 
But the economic reality of tax subsidization of private health insur-
ance is masked. In part, this indirect source of federal assistance is hidden 
because the annual federal accounting of “National Health Expenditures” 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See Drew Altman, Behind the Split Over Linking Medicaid Coverage to Work Require-
ments, WALL STREET J.: WASH. WIRE (May 11, 2015, 9:55 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
2015/05/11/behind-the-split-over-linking-medicaid-coverage-to-work-requirements [https://perma.
cc/PUF4-7JQ7] (discussing various states’ proposals or work requirements for the newly eligible 
Medicaid expansion population). 
 72 KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ARE UNIN-
SURED ADULTS WHO COULD GAIN MEDICAID COVERAGE WORKING? 1–2 (2015), http://files.
kff.org/attachment/fact-sheet-are-uninsured-adults-who-could-gain-medicaid-coverage-working 
[https://perma.cc/S8T4-VFQG] [hereinafter UNINSURED ADULTS] (discussing the red state drive 
for work requirements in implementing Medicaid eligibility expansion under the ACA and the 
demographics of the uninsured population relative to work status). 
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published by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services does not in-
clude tax incentives in its tally.73 Instead, the report examines household, fed-
eral government, state and local government, and private business spending 
on health care.74 Additionally, most private health insurance is obtained as 
an employment benefit, and employees notoriously do not notice how much 
they and their employer contribute to their private insurance, let alone how 
much the federal government subsidizes that insurance through tax breaks.75 
In a 2002 Harvard study, researchers determined that the federal govern-
ment accounts for nearly sixty percent of health spending when tax incen-
tives are counted in federal government spending, rather than just “who 
wrote the last check.”76 Thus, this Article calls private insurance subsi-
dies—whether they pre-date or post-date the ACA—“hidden government 
assistance.” This section considers, briefly, the history and nature of hidden 
government assistance for private health insurance as well as the ACA’s 
reliance on this preexisting system of subsidies. 
Since the early 1900s, cash-payment medical care has been too expen-
sive for low- and middle-income Americans.77 Presidents since Theodore 
Roosevelt have attempted to address the problem of high medical costs, rec-
ognizing that low-income families were suffering due to costly hospital and 
physician bills.78 Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to address health insurance 
in the social insurance manner that European nations were offering it, and 
Harry Truman took up the health insurance fight during his presidency.79 At 
the key moment after World War II when other nations were establishing na-
tional health care systems, national health insurance in the United States was 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See, e.g., National Health Expenditures 2013 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDI-
CAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/F842-NARR]. 
 74 Id. 
 75 To make this information more transparent, the ACA required that W-2 forms include the 
value of health insurance as a specific line item. See Form W-2 Reporting of Employer-Sponsored 
Health Coverage, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Form-W-2-
Reporting-of-Employer-Sponsored-Health-Coverage [https://perma.cc/EGU7-GKLH]; see also Rob-
ert Pear, To Open Eyes, W-2s List Cost of Providing a Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/health/to-open-eyes-w-2s-list-cost-of-health-plans.html [https://
perma.cc/Z3BE-LDKN] (reporting on the new W-2 information designed to enlighten employees as 
to the value of their health insurance). 
 76 Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National Health Insurance—And 
Not Getting It, 21 HEALTH AFF. 88, 88 (2002). 
 77 See STARR, supra note 31, at 36–37; PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN MEDICINE 235–89 (1982) [hereinafter STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION] (ex-
amining political and sociological factors that defeated efforts for a national health insurance pro-
gram in the early to mid-1900s). 
 78 See STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 77, at 243 (discussing Theodore 
Roosevelt’s interest). 
 79 See STARR, supra note 31, at 39–40. 
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defeated by a variety of factors, including political and ideological barriers, 
public ambivalence about appropriate methods for addressing medical ex-
penses, and the American Medical Association’s “socialized medicine” buga-
boo.80 
Instead, health insurance as an employment benefit became an Ameri-
can phenomenon, wherein the federal government encourages employers to 
offer health insurance benefits by deeming them a business expense that is 
excluded from taxable income.81 Simultaneously, employees are encouraged 
to accept this benefit because the value of the health insurance coverage is 
excluded from taxable income.82 This subsidy system has been successful 
from the perspective that a majority of Americans obtain health insurance 
through their employers (53.9% of the population as of 2013).83 But this 
percentage has been decreasing through the last decade or more, in part giv-
ing rise to the high levels of uninsurance that precipitated the ACA’s enact-
ment.84 
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) has called tax subsidies for 
employment-based health insurance the “largest single tax expenditure by 
the federal government.”85 As of 2013, the CBO valued this tax subsidy at 
$248 billion, not including the tax deduction taken by self-employed indi-
viduals (valued at about $6 billion).86 Though rarely discussed as such, this 
tax subsidy is concrete financial support for access to health care through 
subsidized private health insurance. Yet when it is raised as part of health 
reform or other political conversations, rather than expressing concern re-
garding dependency or entitlement, the tax subsidy tends to be critiqued in 
terms of moral hazard (insurance overuse), unequal cost burdens (less af-
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fordable for lower wage earners), or fostering inefficiency (employers have 
no special expertise as health care intermediaries).87 
The ACA builds on the employment-based private health insurance 
system in a number of ways in an effort to achieve universal insurance cov-
erage.88 For example, large employers (already highly likely to provide health 
insurance as an employment benefit) must pay a penalty if they do not offer 
health insurance at all or if the insurance they offer is unaffordable, and their 
employees purchase tax-subsidized insurance on an exchange.89 The ACA 
further fortifies employment-based insurance, especially for small employers 
(those with fewer than fifty employees, which are much less likely to offer 
health insurance benefits),90 by creating special mechanisms for small busi-
nesses to offer affordable health insurance benefits to their employees in 
small groups, which have historically had to pay higher premiums.91 These 
legislative provisions entrenched reliance on the employer-based, private 
insurance model by requiring certain employment benefits, which was his-
torically deemed voluntary on the part of the employer. Further, the “indi-
vidual mandate” facilitates this entrenchment by increasing the likelihood 
that an employee will accept the offered benefit rather than attempt to pock-
et additional salary.92 
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The ACA also invigorated private health insurance markets by unifying 
the rules for individual and small group insurance unrelated to employer ben-
efits.93 Before the ACA, individual health insurance plans were largely unat-
tainable because insurers demanded very high premiums for such plans and 
the offered benefits were highly variable.94 The ACA increased access to a 
private insurance market that was elusive for most Americans by enabling 
access to individual insurance through health insurance exchanges, which 
standardize the minimum allowable benefits for Qualified Health Plans.95 The 
ACA also leveled the playing field by eliminating common exclusionary 
practices such as pre-existing condition clauses.96 
But leveling the playing field would not be enough to facilitate universal 
coverage without some kind of financial adjustment, as the individual and 
small group markets historically have been prohibitively expensive for low- 
and middle-income Americans. Consequently, the ACA created federal tax 
subsidies for insurance premiums to everyone earning 100% to 400% of the 
FPL, or $11,770 to $47,080 for a one-person household.97 These new tax sub-
sidies for health insurance are estimated to cost $45 billion in 2015 and are 
projected to increase to $91 billion by 2017 as implementation of the ACA 
gains momentum through upcoming open enrollment periods.98 These ex-
penses further expand the hidden government assistance for private health 
insurance. 
The private insurance tax subsidies were challenged in King v. Bur-
well.99 In King, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the IRS regulations that 
provide tax subsidies to qualifying purchasers in federally run exchanges as 
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a matter of statutory interpretation.100 This willingness to preserve Con-
gress’s intended role for the subsidies stands in contrast to the Court’s un-
willingness to defer to Congress on the Medicaid expansion in NFIB.101 
Even though the Court undermined Medicaid expansion in NFIB, calling 
the expansion an impermissibly coercive new program, it displayed a nu-
anced and deferential understanding of the importance of tax subsidies in 
the exchanges in King.102 Arguably, in King, the Court not only demonstrat-
ed a better understanding of the ACA103 but also reflected the politically 
preferred status of indirect benefits in private insurance, as compared to 
direct public insurance benefits. 
Although the continued reliance on (employment-based) private health 
insurance is consistent with the narrative of American individualism, Con-
gress expressed through the ACA implicit recognition that most low-to-
middle income Americans simply cannot afford health insurance, even with 
the equalizing rules that the ACA imposes on private health insurers. Very 
few Americans can afford to purchase private health insurance on the open 
market, and the current subsidy numbers underline this fact. Reports indi-
cate that approximately 86% of individuals who purchased health insurance 
through exchanges in the 2015 open enrollment period qualified for tax 
subsidies, and more than half of them were earning less than 250% of the 
FPL.104 Despite the common public narrative that private health insurance is 
consistent with American self-reliance, in reality almost everyone purchas-
ing health insurance, whether individually or through an employer, is re-
ceiving some kind of federal government subsidy to be able to afford it. 
In sum, the American government provides assistance obtaining health 
insurance coverage in two different ways: through highly visible direct ben-
efits and through hidden tax subsidies. Despite the substantial similarities 
between the two models, particularly with respect to low-income popula-
tions, one has been stigmatized and attacked politically in a way the other 
has not. With respect to the poor and near-poor, this differentiation has cre-
ated two perceived classes of individuals: undesirable dependents who rely 
on Medicaid and workers who deserve assistance in participating in the 
American dream. The following Part takes a closer look at the self-reliance 
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narrative underlying this classification and reveals that the dichotomy be-
tween dependents and workers in the context of government assistance in 
health insurance is a false one. 
II. DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF SELF-RELIANCE 
As explored in Part I, politicians have condemned expanding Medicaid 
as fostering a culture of dependence, while the recipients of the low-income 
subsidies have faced no comparable opposition. This Part demonstrates that 
these differing reactions are rooted in the American ideal of self-reliance 
and the corollary construction of individuals in need of support as undesira-
ble dependents. According to this narrative, recipients of visible government 
assistance are lazy and rely on the government as an alternative to being per-
sonally responsible and independent, whereas recipients of hidden govern-
ment assistance are responsible, wage-earning citizens. These beliefs gener-
ate a series of either-or dyads: people are either workers or paupers, inde-
pendent or dependent, good citizens or bad. Through the use of vulnerability 
theory and demographic data, this Part demonstrates that self-reliance is a 
myth and exposes this bifurcated view as a false dichotomy. Specifically, this 
Part asserts that the distinction between visible and hidden government assis-
tance is an unprincipled dividing line, as the very same individuals will find 
themselves qualifying for either form of assistance at any given moment and 
moving between them, a phenomenon called “churn.” In establishing this 
reality, it becomes clear that having two systems for helping the low-income 
population access health care is a needlessly complex and unprincipled 
means for financing health care. 
A. The American Myth of Self-Reliance and Its Dichotomies 
Self-reliance is a long-standing American ideal.105 The United States 
has been cast as the land of opportunity, where anyone from anywhere in 
the world can come to create a fortune and participate in “American Excep-
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tionalism.”106 The narrative of the self-made man, pulled up by his boot-
straps, is a familiar trope, often expressed as “individualism,” meaning that 
the individual makes his or her own fortune, good or bad.107 The converse 
of self-reliance is, of course, dependence. Because of the high value placed 
on (particularly financial) independence, state assistance has been stigma-
tized and devalued.108 
The concept of self-reliance, as a principle in modern American social 
and political discourse, is a myth. Yet, contrary to popular use, the word myth 
does not connote something that is completely false. One author describes 
this use of the word myth as “a complex of profoundly held attitudes and val-
ues which condition the way men view the world and understand their expe-
rience.”109 In her work on vulnerability, Martha Albertson Fineman defines 
myth as “a legendary story that invokes gods and heroes and explains a cul-
tural practice or phenomenon.”110 From this perspective, myths are ideologi-
cal, not factual.111 They represent beliefs about the world, not empirical reali-
ties.112 But, though a myth cannot be disproved, it can be studied for its influ-
ence on policy, politics, law, and its other societal effects.113 
All societies have myths,114 which serve a variety of important func-
tions. They define our national identity (both domestically and in relation to 
other countries), they provide historical context by giving nations origin sto-
ries, they explain social roles and disparities, and they tell us what it means to 
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be good citizens.115 Thus, myths are also aspirational: They not only com-
municate people’s beliefs about how the world is, but they also communi-
cate beliefs about how people think the world should be.116 The myths of 
our own culture tend to be accepted as natural, fundamental truths without 
much critical thought.117 Hence, myths shape cultural worldview and bias 
individual perceptions.118 Moreover, myths tend to support the status quo.119 
Consequently, challenging a nation’s underlying myths to enact social re-
form can be particularly fraught.120 
In the United States—a country whose origin story involves a revolution 
against a tyrannical monarchy121—self-reliance and independence are among 
our most-cherished ideals.122 The American myth of self-reliance is tied up 
with the American dream.123 According to our country’s mythos, with enough 
effort and perseverance, anyone can create the life they want.124 Survey data 
indicate that the American people believe that self-determination and hard 
work result in success.125 This belief also leads Americans to overestimate 
their personal accomplishments and to underestimate the contributions of 
others.126 This perspective mirrors the United States’ origin story as a land of 
plenty, built from nothing.127 The idea that hard work leads to success and 
that anyone can become self-reliant likewise reflects this nation’s capitalist 
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ideals.128 The American dream is, therefore, a dream of individual achieve-
ment.129 This achievement can then be translated into independence.130 Be-
liefs about the importance—and attainability of—“individual independence, 
autonomy, and self-sufficiency” are foundational American myths,131 cham-
pioned by both liberals and conservatives.132 
The myth of self-reliance has a longstanding history. Ancient Greek phi-
losophers first defined self-sufficiency, and Aristotle queried whether self-
reliance is a desirable goal.133 These ideals came early to the United States. 
Seventeenth-century Puritanism advocated hard work and a moral life as the 
pathway to success.134 The primary characters in classic stories of American 
self-reliance were the self-made man,135 individually, and the self-sufficient 
family,136 collectively. For example, these archetypes made regular appear-
ances in McGuffey readers and the writings of Horatio Alger.137 Even today, 
these paradigmatic figures persist. Their legacy can be readily identified in 
the beloved children’s book The Little Engine That Could, the story of a 
self-made protagonist who succeeded through the power of positive think-
ing,138 and in the countless books of the ever-popular self-help industry.139 
Of course, as myths, the notions surrounding autonomy, independence, and 
self-reliance are simply widely held beliefs about how the world operates 
and do not reflect the realities of social mobility in the United States.140 
Nevertheless, several important observations about the American psyche 
and how it shapes the political sphere flow from analyzing these ideologies. 
First, the American ideal of self-reliance takes a simplified and primar-
ily economic view of personhood.141 Economic self-sufficiency becomes 
both a proxy and a precondition for other versions of autonomy and inde-
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pendence.142 Because myths have strong moral components, being finan-
cially independent is also associated with virtue and good moral character. 
Both the Puritan and the greater Protestant traditions equated material suc-
cess with grace and financial ruin with sin.143 Consequently, self-reliance is 
a highly valued trait and characteristic of the ideal American citizen.144 
American notions of self-worth, therefore, are constructed in largely eco-
nomic terms.145 In other words, financial worth becomes self-worth. 
Second, the moral underpinnings and highly desirable social status of 
self-reliance renders economic self-sufficiency a condition of being a good 
citizen. Some have argued that “self-sufficiency” is “a precondition for be-
ing a member of society in good standing” and “an intrinsic obligation of 
healthy adults.”146 But, given that very few Americans can achieve econom-
ic independence without working for someone else, paid labor occupies a 
central role in the myth of self-reliance.147 The myth therefore transforms 
into the social obligation to work for compensation.148 Paid work is thus the 
currency of good, moral citizenship in the United States. 
Conversely, to not be self-sufficient is to be labeled a failure. In a soci-
ety that venerates self-reliance, people who are not economically independ-
ent are not “fully human participants in society.”149 The appropriate social 
reaction to such individuals is either condemnation, at worst, or pity, at 
best.150 Dependency, though—not simply poverty151—is the nemesis of self-
reliance.152 Poverty is an objective state that may at times have certain vir-
tues, whereas dependency as a condition implies that the individual is not a 
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fully developed human being.153 Just as being self-sufficient signals the vir-
tue and good moral character of the ideal citizen, being dependent in the 
United States implies a defect in character that brings with it inferior social 
status.154 Self-reliance and dependency are understood as inherently incom-
patible states and thereby dichotomous terms.155 Yet like its counterpart 
self-reliance, dependency has specific meanings and cultural contexts. To 
start, dependency also has predominantly economic associations.156 It 
means to be dependent on the state for monetary support.157 Dependency is 
therefore synonymous with welfare dependency.158 This use of the word is 
relatively new, however. 
In their work on dependency, Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon identify 
“three principal icons of [post-industrial] dependency,” which function in 
contrast to the white male worker, who is seen as the ideal citizen: the pau-
per, the colonial native or slave, and the housewife.159 The archetypal figure 
of most relevance to this Article is the pauper “who lived not on wages but 
on poor relief”: 
In the strenuous new culture of emergent capitalism, the figure of 
the pauper was like a bad double of the upstanding workingman, 
threatening the latter should he lag. . . . Paupers were not simply 
poor but degraded, their character corrupted and their will sapped 
through reliance on charity. . . . While nineteenth-century charity 
experts acknowledged that poverty could contribute to pauperiza-
tion, they also held that character defects could cause poverty. 
Toward the end of the century, as hereditarian (eugenic) thought 
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caught on, the pauper’s character defects were given a basis in bi-
ology.160 
Casting dependents as socially and morally defective secured the independ-
ent worker’s superior standing. To achieve full membership in society, then, 
one must distinguish oneself from the undesirable classes of dependents.161 
Perhaps the most significant change to come out of the evolving con-
cept of dependency is its relationship to paid work. Whereas wage laborers 
were the paradigmatic dependents of the pre-industrial age, the current con-
struction of dependency situates paid work as its juxtapositional opposite. 
As a result, individuals who work for money are encouraged to believe they 
are achieving self-reliance and therefore superior to individuals who receive 
government benefits.162 The corollary that accompanies the idealization of 
paid labor is the devaluation of welfare relief, rendering a person who de-
pends on government benefits a pauper or a parasite. Welfare recipients in 
America are regarded as undeserving, second-class citizens who shirk their 
responsibility to engage in paid labor.163 
Despite the reality that many government aid recipients also work for 
pay,164 working and receiving government benefits are portrayed as either-
or propositions.165 According to this construction, each individual person 
then chooses between two equally available sources of income, work or 
welfare.166 Put differently, dependency (receiving government benefits) is 
construed as fundamentally incompatible with paid work. Thus, if a person 
receives welfare benefits, it is presumed that person does not also work.167 
Given that a substantial portion of the American population has jobs that do 
                                                                                                                           
 160 Id. at 316–17 (citations omitted). 
 161 Id. at 318. In more recent times, the stigmatized status of the word “dependency” is clear 
from its pathological associations in medicine and psychology, e.g., drug dependency, which then 
bled into other notions of dependency, such as the assumption that welfare recipients are also drug 
addicts. Id. at 325. 
 162 Halvorsen, supra note 122, at 59. 
 163 Alesina et al., supra note 106; Fraser & Gordon, supra note 118, at 315, 329; Halvorsen, 
supra note 122, at 59. 
 164 See infra notes 188–269 and accompanying text (exploring false assumptions that those 
who receive government assistance do not engage in work). 
 165 See Fraser & Gordon, supra note 118, at 328. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Fineman, supra note 131, at 17. Moreover, the notion that so-called welfare mothers do 
not “work” presumes child-rearing does not count as labor. Fraser & Gordon, supra note 118, at 
329. Of course, when upper-class women stay home with their children, they are praised as good 
parents. See id. (discussing a “class double standard” of expectations and perceptions of work 
between wealthy mothers and poor mothers). 
2016] Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance 29 
not pay a living wage, leading workers to also rely on government assis-
tance, this conclusion epitomizes the myth of self-reliance.168 
The American myth of self-reliance can be summarized as follows: 
 Figure 1: Premises and Conclusions of Self-Reliance 
P1: Americans have social and moral duties to work to maintain self-
sufficiency and to avoid dependency. 
C1: Therefore, if people depend on government assistance, then they are so-
cial and moral failures. 
P2: Paid workers are not dependents. 
C2: Therefore, if people receive government benefits, then they do not work 
for pay. 
C3: Therefore, people who receive government benefits are social and moral 
failures who do not work. 
The premises and conclusions above in turn lead to the following dichotomies: 
Figure 2: Self-Reliance/Dependency Dichotomies 
Self-Reliance Dependency 
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Good citizen Bad citizen 
These myths and their corresponding beliefs affect our laws and social 
policies. Social myths, like the myth of self-reliance, are powerful narra-
tives because they are legitimizing. They provide the relevant backdrop for 
the current state of our culture and society and they reinforce the notion that 
our long-standing social structures are fair and just. The self-reliance myth 
tells us that our accomplishments are earned through hard work and virtu-
ous choices.169 As one author stated, “We simply feel better about ourselves 
and our society if we believe our successes in life are not the result of some 
random or unjust forces—which means that stories about self-made men 
and women fit well with how we believe, and we want to believe, the world 
works.”170 It also tells us that those failing to meet the ideal of self-
reliance—those who are dependent—have likewise earned their lot in life 
and deserve their current predicament because of their laziness or their 
moral shortcomings.171 As a result, acting with self-interest is not self-
centered or greedy but rather an act of personal responsibility.172 
Although there may not be a strong sense of collective responsibility in 
the United States, poverty nonetheless constitutes a well-recognized social 
and political problem. Yet the response has been to help only those deemed 
deserving of aid. Consequently, lawmakers and policymakers have divided 
the poor into distinct groups: unfortunates who merit assistance, and para-
sites who warrant begrudging and limited help.173 Those individuals who 
deserve assistance will be familiar to many as the “deserving poor”: the el-
derly, children, widows, the disabled—those society has deemed blameless 
in their poverty.174 
By contrast, the undeserving poor do not merit governmental support 
because they are deemed poor by choice.175 According to this construction, 
dependency is in an individual character defect or pathology.176 The need 
for help is not a product of misfortune or circumstances but rather the result 
of personal failings. It follows that the undeserving poor are by definition 
unworthy of assistance.177 After all, why should the government help those 
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who do not help themselves? The government need not intervene; their sta-
tion is a personal—not a societal—failure.178 Hence, the myth of self-reliance 
serves to maintain the status quo by assuring potential reformers that there is 
no need for widespread social, legal, or political change: the wealthy and 
powerful deserve their successes and the impoverished and disempowered 
deserve their struggles.179 In this view, the goal of good social policy is to 
differentiate the deserving poor from the undeserving paupers. 
The opposition to government assistance has created a corresponding 
preference for privatization.180 Because popular wisdom holds that the pri-
vate market thrives with less legal and regulatory oversight, deregulation 
and small government have now become popular public policy goals.181 The 
backlash against government benefits and the push toward privatization of-
fer another set of useful dichotomies for analyzing the post-ACA health care 
system: private/public, work/welfare, free market/government, and person-
al/collective responsibility. 
Among the visible and hidden forms of government assistance described 
in Part I, only the one strongly associated with dependency—Medicaid—has 
been stigmatized. The program has faced such stigma that even individuals in 
great need have been hesitant to accept assistance. Moreover, ongoing hostil-
ity toward public benefits generally—and Medicaid specifically—is evident 
from the opposition to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, described above.182 
As discussed, excepting King, no such animosity accompanies the low-
income subsidies. Revisiting the myth-enforcing dichotomies above helps 
to explain this divided approach to health care financing. 
Consider first Medicaid recipients. Because they rely on the govern-
ment for health care benefits, they are presumed to be social and moral fail-
ures, as demonstrated by the stigma associated with the program. Next, re-
gardless of whether Medicaid recipients are actually working, it is assumed 
they do not have jobs. People on Medicaid are presumed to be parasitic de-
pendents, the undertone of which is that they are bad Americans. It is no 
surprise, then, that proposals to reform Medicaid have included employ-
ment initiatives designed to spur recipients into self-reliance, and recent 
gubernatorial efforts to bend the ACA to the right have included work-
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search proposals.183 For example, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey recently 
approved restrictions on his state’s existing Medicaid expansion that would 
require the newly eligible to be employed in order to continue to qualify 
and would terminate their benefits after five years (presumably to prevent 
“dependency”).184 
The persistent employer-provided benefits system, despite substantial 
hidden government subsidies,185 can also be viewed through the lens of self-
reliance. Workers are understood as personally responsible, self-sustaining, 
and independent—ideal Americans—because they “earn” access to health 
insurance via their employment. Health insurance and meaningful health 
care access is then something primarily reserved for the “good” working 
population. Thus, the dichotomy of “good” workers and “bad” dependents 
is an American myth that applies with equal force to the health care sphere 
as in other questions of government assistance. 
Moreover, the political preference for privatization as a means for ad-
dressing inequalities was clearly part of the ACA’s architecture,186 which 
relied on employer-provided benefits and distinctly favored the private sec-
tor. Further, with respect to benefits to the poor, the low-income subsidies—
which can be used to purchase health insurance on the private market—
have created far less friction than the ACA’s attempt at a public option, 
Medicaid expansion. Consequently, the ACA expressed a preference for 
purchasing private health insurance—even if highly subsidized—over gov-
ernment-provided benefits. This preference for private markets flies in the 
face of long-standing evidence that the administrative costs for private 
health insurers are higher than those for Medicare or Medicaid.187 One can 
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therefore see the public versus private dichotomy played out in health care 
with the preference for the low-income subsidies, despite the questionable 
economics of this private market structure. 
The dependency versus self-reliance narrative in health care is prob-
lematic for at least two reasons. First, it stigmatizes recipients of govern-
ment assistance so significantly that they may choose not to reap the bene-
fits of those initiatives. Individuals who qualify for Medicaid may reject the 
only available gateway to needed health care out of the fear of being stig-
matized. Second, it provides politicians with a very powerful discourse for 
not supporting the ACA’s legislative principle of universality, which capital-
izes on the well-worn rhetoric of American self-reliance and the construc-
tion of dependency as a social harm. Professor Fineman’s vulnerability the-
ory, however, reveals that self-reliance is a myth and all humans are con-
stantly vulnerable to becoming dependent. 
B. Debunking the Dividing Line 
The American myth of self-reliance valorizes self-sufficiency and in-
dependence and positions dependency in conflict with paid labor. Its theo-
retical roots lie in the ideals of free will and personal responsibility for for-
tunes and misfortunes. These myths and belief systems have infiltrated the 
debates surrounding health care reform and are readily discernible in both 
the hostility to the Medicaid expansion and the support for the low-income 
subsidy. A closer examination of these beliefs reveals that they are both the-
oretically and practically unsound. 
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1. Dividing Line as Theoretically Unprincipled 
For a theoretical excavation of the myth of self-reliance, this subsec-
tion looks to Professor Fineman’s work on universal vulnerability. Her work 
takes aim at the centrality of autonomy in American life and culture, as well 
as the accompanying trend away from collective responsibility and toward 
privatization, deregulation, and reliance on the free market as the proper 
methods of social reform. 
According to Fineman, the myths described above have had a negative 
impact on American society. She explains that American beliefs surround-
ing the desirability and attainability of self-sufficiency have affected the 
way in which we understand equality, as well as the role of the state.188 As 
discussed above, the myth of self-reliance holds that, through enough hard 
work and discipline, independence is available to everyone. This particular 
conception of autonomy is incompatible with vulnerability and dependence; 
it assumes that decisionmakers are independent actors capable of making 
their own unconstrained choices. Society equates failure with personal 
shortcomings and blames dependency on the very government programs 
designed to help those in need, thereby avoiding important issues of social 
justice.189 The move away from government aid privatizes issues of de-
pendency by situating them as problems for individual families and not for 
society as a whole.190 Blaming others (and their families) for their depend-
ency allows the state to avoid taking collective action to remedy social ine-
quality.191 
By valuing autonomy over substantive equality, Americans have de-
veloped a preference for formal equality (treating people the same) and for 
a limited role of the state.192 The current American legal construction of 
equality, particularly in the context of equal protection, is, therefore, narrow, 
identity-based, and “takes only a limited view of what should constitute 
governmental responsibility in regard to social justice issues.”193 Pursuant to 
this kind of thinking, government benefits are undesirable because they sin-
gle out certain groups for assistance—thereby violating formal equality—
and because they require an expanded role for the government. The back-
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lash against government intervention within the past thirty years has been 
socially damaging, as the programs being attacked and rolled back had tan-
gible benefits for the disadvantaged.194 The result of the backlash has been 
an unresponsive government that is unwilling to address the structural bar-
riers that perpetuate existing disparities.195 Thus, for Americans to achieve 
meaningful reform, we must be willing to rethink our foundational myths.196 
In particular, Fineman urges us to reconsider the current relationships be-
tween autonomy, dependency, and equality.197 
Vulnerability theory provides a tool for reassessing the myth of self-
reliance. Fineman argues that the proper construction of equality is equal 
opportunity, not formal equal treatment.198 She contends that the current 
construction of autonomy is a fiction because of humanity’s shared vulnera-
bility. She therefore challenges many of the established ideological dichot-
omies underlying the myth of self-reliance (described earlier in this Part).199 
By advocating a theory that presents dependency as both inevitable and 
universal, Fineman argues in favor of a heightened sense of collective re-
sponsibility and a state that is responsive to the needs of its citizenry be-
cause no human being is—or can be—truly independent.200 
Dependency does not exist in a single metric: it is a complex concept 
with varying axes and degrees.201 For the purposes of this discussion of health 
care, biological and economic dependency are most relevant. The inevitabil-
ity of biological dependency is perhaps the easiest to understand because all 
have experienced it firsthand. As Fineman explains, “Far from being patho-
logical, avoidable, and the result of individual failings, a state of dependency 
is a natural part of the human condition and is developmental in nature.”202 
We were all dependent as children and we may well become dependent again 
through old age or disability. Hence, dependency is simply part of being hu-
man.203 Moreover, because everyone is vulnerable to injury, disease, aging, 
and disability, we could all find ourselves dependent at a moment’s notice.204 
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Yet although we are all universally vulnerable, depending on our bodily and 
environmental conditions, we are all at varying degrees of that vulnerabil-
ity.205 Although the ubiquity of biological dependency is hard to refute, the 
inevitability of other kinds of dependency, like economic dependency, is not 
generally recognized.206 
Yet economic dependency is almost as universal as biological depend-
ency. Despite the United States’ relative affluence and opportunity, one in 
six adult Americans and one in five American children live in poverty.207 
Moreover, almost all Americans depend on some kind of financial support 
outside of their immediate family to survive.208 By objective measures, peo-
ple who work for pay are not inherently independent or self-reliant.209 The 
choice for the vast majority of Americans is, therefore, not between de-
pendency or self-reliance but rather between being dependent on the state or 
being dependent on employment.210 Moreover, Fineman points out that even 
the highest-level CEO’s success still depends on the labor of secretaries and 
truck drivers.211 Because we are all interdependent, we can never assume 
that any one person is completely self-sufficient.212 As another author ex-
plains, “The problem is not dependency per se, but society’s labeling of 
some groups of people in particular circumstances as dependent.” 213 
Furthermore, despite the dichotomies described previously in section 
A, paid work and dependence on government benefits are not mutually ex-
clusive. Particularly, many people in the United States either do not have 
access to paid work or do not have access to a living wage.214 When the 
number of jobs that are available goes down, individuals who would prefer 
to be working must join the ranks of the unemployed. As of 2014, there 
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were approximately two job seekers for every available job.215 Put another 
way, at least half of the population who wanted to work could not; or, the 
only available jobs were low-pay, low-skill, hourly-wage jobs that often do 
not offer benefits at all, or not at affordable cost.216 Government assistance 
is crucial for those people. And for every percentage increase in the rate of 
unemployment, the number of Medicaid enrollees goes up by one million 
people.217 The political position described in Part I, that Medicaid is there-
fore inappropriate for able-bodied, single adults, rings especially hollow. 
Furthermore, low-paying jobs do little to remove families from poverty.218 
To put it bluntly, working for pay does not guarantee self-reliance.219 
Based on these realities, self-reliance, at least as constructed in the 
American ethos, is a myth. It is a myth both in the sense that it provides a 
socio-cultural backdrop for many of our laws and social policies (as de-
scribed in section A of Part II) and in the sense that it is untrue (as described 
directly above). The promise of self-reliance that permeates American cul-
tural life is both impossible—because of the universality of dependency and 
vulnerability—and undesirable—because such a worldview excludes any-
one who is not a fully functioning, unencumbered adult.220 
As discussed earlier, assuming that all individuals are autonomous 
stagnates reform because people are assumed to get what they deserve.221 
This assumption constrains political power because any effort to change the 
status quo appears to either limit freedom or engage in redistribution.222 Al-
ternatively, construing autonomy as a goal for public policy favors efforts to 
create equal opportunities for all Americans.223 According to the latter view, 
independence occurs when a person has access to basic resources allowing 
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participation in both society’s benefits and burdens.224 Lacking necessities, 
like food, shelter, and clothing, constrains the choices available to an indi-
vidual.225 Pursuant to this framework, autonomy is not an assumed state of 
the human condition but rather an aspiration. 
Additionally, much like dependency and vulnerability, subsidy is also 
universal. Because dependency at varying points and to varying extents in 
our lives is inevitable, reliance on the government for support is likewise 
inevitable.226 Fineman’s theory of universal vulnerability, therefore, also 
captures the notion of universal subsidy.227 Frequently subsidies are under-
stood as direct economic or monetary assistance, yet subsidies can come in 
many different forms and from many different sources.228 Thus, subsidies 
include both visible government wealth transfers, as in Medicare and Medi-
caid, as well as hidden wealth transfers, such as tax benefits.229 
From this perspective, no one in modern society is truly economically 
or socially self-sufficient.230 Fineman puts it bluntly: “[W]e all live subsi-
dized lives.” 231 Yet not all subsidies are stigmatized or linked with depend-
ency.232 Insofar as various subsidies have been associated with visible gov-
ernment assistance, as in the case of the Medicaid program, they have been 
linked to socially undesirable dependency and construed as antithetical to 
self-reliance.233 By contrast, subsidies that tend to perpetuate wealth and priv-
ilege are rarely labeled as such.234 Both politicians and the American public 
tend to apply different standards of self-reliance to different situations. In par-
ticular, Fineman points out that assistance for disaster relief or for corporate 
failures is not met with the same kinds of resistance as government aid to the 
poor.235 The real puzzle then lies in why some subsidies face significant stig-
ma while others remain insulated from public scrutiny.236   
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Consequently, autonomy as a central governing principle envisions a 
particular role for the state. The issue for reformers is not to eradicate de-
pendency or subsidies but rather to provide for the citizenry.237 Fineman 
makes a claim for collective responsibility.238 She therefore argues for sub-
stantive, as opposed to formal, equality. This notion of equality seeks to elim-
inate disparities and to minimize oppression and exploitation.239 It sets a 
floor of basic resources and dignity under which individual citizens cannot 
drop.240 Ensuring this brand of equality requires the active involvement of 
the state.241 True equality of opportunity, therefore, obligates the govern-
ment to provide access to social goods, such as wealth, health, employment, 
or security, and to ensure that the opportunities are evenly distributed so that 
no person or groups of persons are unduly privileged while others have few 
or no opportunities.242 Replacing formal equal treatment by the state with 
equality of opportunity, Fineman posits, can actually enhance liberty and 
freedom by providing individuals who are limited under the current regime 
with more meaningful choices.243 
In sum, vulnerability theory is a particularly powerful tool to advocate 
for social justice for the poor, who lack status before the Supreme Court and 
Congress as an independent antidiscrimination category, and who lack polit-
ical power in general.244 The theory applies particularly well to issues of 
health care access for lower income Americans, because it is exactly the 
kind of social good that would be included in a meaningful construction of 
substantive equality. Moreover, health care access intersects with dependen-
cy in a number of important ways. People with limited access to medical 
treatment experience heightened levels of vulnerability. Because of their 
limited resources, they may wait until a condition has progressed relatively 
far before obtaining health care or may go without treatment altogether. 
Thus, people whose economic status restricts their health care access are 
also more likely to find themselves sick or disabled. That is, they are more 
likely to end up in states of biological dependency. 
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This lens reveals that the ACA’s attempt to provide universal health in-
surance coverage is not merely a contentious partisan issue but rather an 
essential element to recognizing and responding to the inherent vulnerabil-
ity of all Americans.245 Understanding health care reform through vulnerabil-
ity theory emphasizes the law’s equalizing and social justice effects, which 
are possible when the myth of self-reliance is unveiled so that policy can 
move toward a more just and responsive state. Post-ACA, poorer individu-
als have access to two different avenues of government assistance: the ex-
panded Medicaid program and the low-income subsidy for private insur-
ance—initiatives that can be understood as examples of the state responding 
to the concerns of its vulnerable citizens. 
These programs also powerfully demonstrate that no bright line exists 
between work and welfare. First, two-thirds of the uninsured have at least 
one full-time or part-time worker in their household.246 Work no longer 
equates to health care benefits. Second, the ACA’s expansion will render 
Medicaid the primary health insurance provider for the working poor. As 
expanded, Medicaid will cover non-elderly, non-disabled adults regardless 
of their work status.247 Many of the working poor do not receive employer-
provided benefits, or are offered benefits that are too expensive,248 rendering 
Medicaid’s public insurance benefit a foundational benefit for the health care 
access of Americans under the age of sixty-five.249 Third, one study found 
that, if the Supreme Court had ruled against the government in its 2015 
King v. Burwell decision, of the individuals who would have lost their sub-
sidies, 46% work full-time and 35% work part-time.250 A substantial portion 
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of working Americans must depend on government supports, visible and hid-
den, to access private health care, especially given that employer-sponsored 
insurance has been decreasing over the last eight years.251 Fourth, the phe-
nomenon called “churn,” discussed in subsection 2, shows that public or 
private insurance status is a false indicator of “self-reliance.” 
2. Dividing Line as Empirically Unprincipled 
On one dimension, the ACA’s statutory drive for universality demon-
strates the responsive state addressing inevitable human vulnerability, re-
gardless of work status. But, on a different dimension, the statute’s perpetu-
ation of the divided public versus private, dependent versus worker system 
extends the dichotomies explored earlier in this Part. These dyads do not 
reflect reality, as many Americans simultaneously work and rely on public 
benefits. More pointedly, contrary to the “able-bodied” rhetoric, most indi-
viduals who are newly eligible for Medicaid are also employed or in a 
household with a worker.252 Although expansion-resistant politicians have 
cast Medicaid recipients as undesirable dependents who do not deserve 
governmental assistance,253 individuals receiving the low-income subsidy 
have been immune from such labels. This discrepancy is attributable to the 
differing views surrounding visible and hidden government benefits. This 
subsection shows that the dividing line between individuals on Medicaid 
and individuals receiving the low-income subsidy breaks down both on the 
theoretical and the data-driven, applied level. 
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The ACA’s benefits for lower-income Americans provide a real-time 
case study for the arbitrary line drawn between socially acceptable and so-
cially stigmatized government subsidies. Because the expanded Medicaid 
program provides visible government assistance and has been historically 
associated with welfare, which signals dependency, it has faced political 
opposition. But because the low-income subsidy is hidden assistance that 
facilitates purchasing health insurance on the private market, it has escaped 
self-reliance scrutiny. Even an individual subsidized completely—having all 
health insurance costs paid by the government—does not experience the 
stigma and political rhetoric of self-reliance scrutiny like the person who 
receives Medicaid benefits. 
The artificial dividing line between people enrolled in Medicaid and 
people receiving low-income subsidies is not just theoretically false, it is 
quantifiably erroneous. Recall that Medicaid, as expanded, provides bene-
fits to any non-elderly individual who earns up to 138% of the FPL and that 
the low-income subsidies are available, on a sliding scale, to individuals 
making 100% to 400% of the FPL. Because income and employment (with 
its attendant benefits) are variable, especially for hourly and low-wage work-
ers, individuals bounce back and forth between the two vectors of health in-
surance, a phenomenon called “churn.”254 Before the ACA, low-income 
Americans were more likely to churn in and out of Medicaid, with no other 
affordable insurance mechanism existing to assist them when Medicaid eli-
gibility ceased. Now, churn will occur between Medicaid and subsidized 
private insurance plans on the exchanges in states that have expanded Med-
icaid eligibility, which is less harmful to the insured.255 Churn is estimated 
to affect 50% of the newly insured Medicaid population.256 
Churn is not a new problem; in 2003, one prominent article identified 
seven different patterns of insurance coverage instability. 257 The problem of 
churn and its economic and medical effects was well known when the ACA 
was enacted. But churn has been exacerbated by the divided structure of 
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universal health insurance coverage under the ACA.258 In the past few 
years, studies first predicted and then documented the phenomenon of churn 
in the era of the ACA, which is (counterintuitively) worse in richer states 
because they have more people living near or just above the FPL.259 Poorer 
states have more people living below the poverty level, so their coverage is 
less likely to change with small gains or losses in income.260 
Whether an individual receives public or private insurance under the 
ACA’s design is dependent on income, which appears a reasonable metric 
on the surface. But consider how churn highlights the illogical line between 
public and private insurance, with all of their underlying implications: a 
person who earns 140% of the FPL obtains private insurance on an ex-
change and is given generous subsidies for insurance premiums and any 
cost-sharing, but a person who earns 138% of the FPL qualifies for Medi-
caid and is receiving generous governmental insurance coverage (that large-
ly forbids cost-sharing without a special waiver). At least one of these two 
people will, in any twelve-month period, move between Medicaid and sub-
sidized private insurance. In non-expansion states, the person earning 138% 
of FPL will fall into the “penultimate poor” category, meaning no Medicaid 
expansion coverage exists once he or she churns out of private insurance. 
Further, consider the income difference (or lack thereof). In 2015, the 
FPL was $11,770 in income per year for a single individual,261 so 138% of 
the FPL was $16,242.60. That individual earns $1353.55 per month, or 
$338.38 per week, or $67.67 per day in a five-day workweek (slightly more 
than a person earning minimum wage). By comparison, 140% of the FPL is 
$16,478 in annual income, or $1373.16 per month, or $343.29 per week, or 
$68.65 per day in a five-day workweek. In other words, the difference be-
tween the low-income subsidy and Medicaid is only several hundred dollars 
per year, the equivalent of a few days’ pay. The person earning 140% of the 
FPL will then move from being deemed a self-reliant private insurance pur-
chaser to a dependent Medicaid beneficiary after missing only a few days of 
work. 
Studies have shown that individuals earning at the level of the FPL are 
the most likely to experience fluctuations in income and employment that 
result in churn.262 Indeed, for someone earning 100% of the FPL, one day’s 
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work is all it would take to lose private insurance and either enroll in Medi-
caid or lose coverage, depending on the state. To wit: a person earning the 
2015 FPL of $11,770 per year, or $980.33 per month, or $245 per week, or 
$49.04 per day (in a five-day workweek) will lose subsidized coverage by 
missing just one day of work, given that an individual earning minimum 
wage would gross $58 in one day. By this admittedly simplistic calculation, 
one day’s work is the difference between insurance and non-insurance in 
non-expansion states, and three-and-a-half days’ work is the difference in 
expansion states. 
This distinction between self-reliance and dependence is completely 
arbitrary, yet very real given that people move—predictably—in and out of 
the safety net due to job status and other circumstances often beyond indi-
vidual control. The difference between 140% and 138% of the FPL is not 
one between self-reliance and dependence. Missing work because of a brief 
illness or a family obligation could easily result in churn from the private to 
the public system. Somewhat ironically, the penultimate poor in non-
expansion states are like Medicaid beneficiaries, who historically have cy-
cled between Medicaid and non-insurance. Now, people enrolled in subsi-
dized qualified health plans on the exchanges will also cycle between insur-
ance and non-insurance in non-expansion states, even though the ACA in-
tended Medicaid to catch all who churn off of public insurance to facilitate 
universality. 
Furthermore, many Americans who are not currently in need of visible 
government assistance in obtaining health care could find themselves en-
rolled in Medicaid as the result of circumstances such as pregnancy and 
childbirth, disability, or old age. One aspect of Medicaid that renders its 
safety net effective is continual open enrollment, unlike the private insur-
ance on the exchanges. Even prior to the ACA, Medicaid provided medical 
assistance to substantial numbers of pregnant women, funding half of the 
births in the United States and two-thirds of unplanned pregnancies (half of 
pregnancies are unplanned in the United States).263 The program also cov-
ered over one-third of American children as of 2012.264 As expanded, Medi-
caid will also cover many non-elderly, non-disabled adults regardless of 
their work status.265 Finally, as the primary funder of long-term care and 
mental health care in the United States, Medicaid plays a significant role in 
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the event of disability and at the end of life.266 Thus, Medicaid is the prima-
ry provider of health care for inevitably, though unforeseeably, dependent 
persons. Even an economically stable person who currently relies on the 
private market could also land in the public system as the result of a life 
event causing either temporary or permanent dependence. 
Not only is the dividing line between visible and hidden government 
assistance empirically unprincipled, it is also harmful.267 Maintaining two 
completely distinct, complex programs for effectively the same population 
generates complications and efficiency costs as those individuals bounce 
between the different systems. Just when an individual has obtained one 
type of benefit and become acquainted with its rules and intricacies, that 
individual may be forced to seek a different type of benefit from a different 
source because of a one-day change in income. Churn is administratively 
inefficient and costly for the government and for insurance enrollees.268 
Churn also causes insurance loss and provider change when moving be-
tween plans, leading to less efficient and less effective medical care if not 
total loss of care.269 And, churn exposes the insured to financial risk when 
health care must be obtained without insurance coverage. But churn is a 
symptom of the larger problem, which is the need to overcome the myth of 
self-reliance in policymaking, especially in the health care sphere. 
As explained in the above sections, the myth of self-reliance permeates 
American culture, including the health insurance system, perpetuating false 
dichotomies. Individuals who receive government benefits through Medi-
caid are undesirable “dependents,” whereas those who obtain private health 
insurance—even if heavily subsidized—are good workers and productive 
citizens. This division proves false both theoretically and through demo-
graphic data. All human beings are potentially vulnerable and dependency 
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is universal. Moreover, individuals who benefit from Medicaid and the sub-
sidies are largely the same populations, with low-income Americans mov-
ing from one system to the other and back again. Yet on one side of the line 
there is political and social support, and on the other there has been vitriolic 
opposition and self-reliance scrutiny. Not only is the current distinction be-
tween visible and hidden assistance for the poor unprincipled, it is also so-
cially damaging, as time and resources are wasted and medical care is missed 
when individuals move between the two systems. Hence, health care is not an 
opportunity to be seized by the self-reliant individualist but rather a public 
good that will be needed by all, as underlined by the ACA’s universality. To 
that end, the following Part proposes erasing this false dividing line. 
III. MOVING BEYOND MYTHS: TOWARD A UNIFIED SYSTEM 
Having established that self-reliance in health care is a myth and that, 
by consequence, the dividing line between visible and hidden government 
assistance is unprincipled and perhaps even harmful to patients, this Article 
now turns to addressing this seemingly intractable and uniquely American 
problem. This Part proposes that Congress should abandon the bifurcated 
insurance system continued by the ACA for low-income Americans and 
adopt a unified structure that reflects the intended universality of the ACA. 
This Part therefore explores the benefits and drawbacks of a single 
program of government assistance for health insurance, either based in the 
ACA’s tax subsidies or in Medicaid, to facilitate a simpler, more effective, 
and perhaps even less stigmatized, system of support for the poor. This pro-
posal works with the structure of the ACA because it appears to be on solid 
legal ground in the post-NFIB and post-King era.270 The authors recognize, 
however, that the ACA may be itself an interim step toward a more radically 
revised health care system, perhaps one less path-dependent and complex. 
This exploration is deliberately limited in light of the political realities of 
the current Congress, which seems hopelessly deadlocked on most matters 
health care-related. 
A. Subsidy-Based Unified System 
One possibility for a unified health insurance system, given the current 
structure of health insurance under the ACA, would be to eliminate the his-
torically contentious Medicaid program entirely and to instead provide ac-
cess to health insurance exclusively through tax subsidies. Such an ap-
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proach has positive and negative ramifications from a variety of viewpoints, 
including personal and programmatic stigma perpetuation, access to care, 
administrative matters, and cost control implications. 
Within the context of this Article’s exploration of the myth of self-
reliance, a subsidy-based unified program would likely thwart a significant 
amount of dependency rhetoric and its attendant imposed stigma. Under 
such a system, anyone who needed government assistance to pay for health 
insurance would receive the more politically accepted hidden government 
assistance of tax subsidies. As a result, no one would be labeled an unde-
serving able-bodied dependent on the basis of need for government assis-
tance when obtaining health insurance.271 
The absence of personal stigma could in turn have a positive effect on 
health care access by stimulating enrollment by those already eligible. As 
noted, eligible individuals may avoid enrolling in Medicaid because they do 
not want to be classified as socially undesirable dependents.272 The absence 
of comparable animosity toward the hidden subsidy indicates that more 
people may be willing to accept such benefits when they qualify. In fact, the 
ACA contains a provision that combats Medicaid’s stigma by facilitating 
enrollment through “no wrong door” policies, meaning a person who ap-
plies through an exchange but who qualifies for Medicaid will be directed 
appropriately to Medicaid, and vice versa. This unified enrollment mecha-
nism is administratively efficient, but it also hides the Medicaid application, 
creating an equalizing and less stigmatizing effect that encourages enroll-
ment.273 Thus, government assistance through hidden benefits could capture 
more individuals in need than visible government assistance. 
In addition, private insurance historically offers a wider network of 
health care providers to policyholders than Medicaid. In part, this phenom-
enon is related to private insurance paying providers more than both Medi-
care and Medicaid on average. In part, the wider network is related to the 
stigma that Medicaid beneficiaries and the program itself face in physicians’ 
offices, where they are often labeled as noncompliant and difficult, among 
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other epithets. Health care providers often perceive Medicaid as more admin-
istratively difficult than private insurance, as states can be very slow to pay in 
addition to paying lower rates than other forms of health insurance.274 Ac-
cordingly, having low-income populations in private insurance plans could 
increase their access to health care providers in meaningful ways because 
they would bypass the Medicaid stigma both personally and programmati-
cally. But this anti-stigma effect on access could be defeated by the post-
ACA trend toward narrow networks, in which insurers engage fewer health 
care providers in an effort to control costs.275 
Yet, although an all-subsidy system may avoid the personal and pro-
grammatic stigma of dependency and positively impact access, it leaves the 
beliefs and dichotomies of the self-reliance myth intact. Though Medicaid 
recipients’ stigma would be alleviated, the beneficiaries of other visible bene-
fits programs (namely welfare programs) would still find themselves subject 
to self-reliance scrutiny. A subsidy-based unified system might thereby des-
tigmatize government aid for health insurance but not for other kinds of 
visible government assistance. 
Eliminating Medicaid and replacing it with an all-subsidy private in-
surance model could have administrative implications. For example, the 
current subsidy operates as a tax credit.276 Individuals can receive their sup-
port in one of two ways: either (1) as a direct payment to an insurer on the 
marketplace to lower the recipient’s costs or (2) as an adjustment on the 
person’s tax return.277 Recipients can decide how much of their credit they 
would like to apply toward their monthly premiums and how much they 
would like to receive at tax time.278 Advocates of tax-based welfare initia-
tives have also asserted that hidden benefits are more administratively effi-
cient than their more visible counterparts because most people already file 
annual tax returns. For example, proponents of the earned income tax credit 
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and other programs argue that such programs could reduce the role of com-
plex and costly bureaucracy.279 
In terms of economic benefits, an all-subsidy program may hold poten-
tial for more economic flexibility, and perhaps cost savings, than Medicaid. 
Although states may vary in terms of the benefits they provide recipients 
above the federally required mandatory floor, once enrolled, Medicaid ben-
eficiaries for the most part have free access to their state’s program.280 In 
other words, a person who is at 138% of the FPL and a person at 38% of the 
FPL will have access to the same set of benefits at the same cost if they live 
in the same place. Conversely, the low-income subsidy provides tax credits 
on a sliding scale, according to income level. Unlike Medicaid’s equalizing 
uniformity, the low-income subsidy’s structure allows the government to 
tailor the level of assistance to each individual’s economic need. This level 
of specificity could make the unified subsidy option more economically 
efficient because it could reduce the chances that a person might receive more 
of a benefit than what is actually required, and only individuals with the 
greatest need would get policies that are fully funded by the government. This 
flexibility might be politically palatable on both sides of the aisle. 
Although tax credits have generally gained popularity as a “pro-work” 
alternative to direct assistance,281 they face certain administrative limits as a 
welfare-policy vehicle. To start, not everyone must file a tax return. Specifi-
cally, the poor are not typically required to file, unless they are seeking a tax 
credit.282 Thus, one drawback of an all-subsidy system is that those who are 
in need of government assistance with health insurance may not regularly 
file tax returns. Requiring government assistance to turn on filing a tax re-
turn—when the person would not otherwise be obligated to do so and per-
haps cannot afford to do so—could therefore inadvertently exclude a signif-
                                                                                                                           
 279 Alstott, supra note 271, at 564–65. 
 280 Some states have been requiring cost-sharing as part of their § 1115 waivers to expand 
Medicaid under the ACA. MARYBETH MUSMECI & ROBIN RUDOWITZ, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
THE ACA AND MEDICAID EXPANSION WAIVERS 8–9 (2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-
brief-the-aca-and-medicaid-expansion-waivers [https://perma.cc/3MS6-PY2P]. And the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 as well as the ACA allowed states to engage in some cost-sharing experi-
ments, especially with the newly eligible population (under the ACA). Paradise, supra note 40, at 
5; see also infra note 309 (discussing the Deficit Reduction Act). 
 281 Alstott, supra note 271, at 539 n.22 (quoting 139 CONG. REC. H5532 (daily ed. July 30, 
1993) (statement of Rep. Richardson)) (explaining that advocates of the EITC described the tax 
credit as “pro-work because, unlike other forms of assistance to the poor, only those who work 
and have earnings can receive benefits”). 
 282 Id. at 585. 
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icant portion of government beneficiaries, thereby undermining the goal of 
the program.283 
Even assuming that eligible individuals file tax returns, the subsidy 
still faces other administrative challenges as a vehicle of government assis-
tance for the poor. One scholar explains that a tax-based welfare program 
must inevitably confront the issue of how to measure income, as defining 
income for tax purposes and defining income for benefits purposes serve 
two different sets of objectives.284 “Income” in the benefits context is more 
rightly understood as a proxy for “economic resources.”285 Hence, in as-
sessing income, tax-based welfare programs are attempting to assess need. 
Taxable income is such a flawed measure of need, though, that another 
scholar has opined: 
Taxable income as defined for the federal income tax is so poor a 
definition of need that to use it as the base for negative income 
tax payments would be a travesty of common sense and good jus-
tice. Society does not want to pay benefits to people with low 
taxable income but with ample resources—wealth, tax-exempt in-
terest, capital gains, pensions, social security stipends, college fel-
lowships, large itemized deductions, gift receipts, and so on.286 
Thus, although a subsidy system could offer a finer calibration of need be-
cause it operates on a sliding scale, using taxable income as a baseline could 
result in an allocation of benefits that does not correspond to actual re-
sources.287 
In addition, scholars point out that there is a lag between changes in 
income and the responsiveness of the tax system. Depending on the given 
tax structure and its associated accounting periods, a tax credit may either 
favor or harm individuals with fluctuating or with steady incomes.288 Be-
cause incomes fluctuate, the associated benefit will also shift—going back 
to the problem of churn, discussed above. The HealthCare.gov website ex-
plains that, “If your income changes, or if you add or lose members of your 
                                                                                                                           
 283 Anne Alstott makes a similar observation regarding the EITC. See id. (“Ironically, the 
traditional tax policy goal of exempting the poor from income taxation tends to undermine auto-
matic EITC participation.”). 
 284 Id. at 566–69. 
 285 Id. at 571. 
 286 Id. at 573 (quoting James Tobin, Raising the Incomes of the Poor, in AGENDA FOR THE 
NATION 113 (Kermit Gordon ed., 1968)). 
 287 Id. at 576–79. 
 288 Id. at 579–83. 
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household, your premium tax credit will probably change too.”289 Specifi-
cally, it explains that if an individual actually makes more than originally 
anticipated, he or she might have to pay back some—even all—of the pre-
mium tax credit received.290 A person with an unstable income who needs a 
subsidy may not be able to afford the cost of the full premium up front. The 
website also cautions individuals that they must immediately report any life 
changes that could affect their subsidy amount or they could end up owing 
money to the government.291 In 2015, by at least one estimate, two-thirds of 
subsidy recipients ended up owing the government some amount of money 
at tax time.292 That said, it is also possible that a Medicaid recipient might end 
up owing the government money. If a person’s income increases past the eli-
gibility point while on benefits, the government may require reimbursement 
for services received before the change in status officially took effect. On the 
other hand, for a program offering a single level of support, eligibility is an 
up-or-down determination. A person cannot be partially eligible. 
Finally, private insurance is, by most accounts, more expensive, ad-
ministratively and in terms of the cost of care, than public insurance.293 Re-
searchers have consistently found that private insurance is more costly than 
public insurance.294 This may in part be due to the fact that we invite the mid-
                                                                                                                           
 289 How to Save on Your Monthly Insurance Bill with a Premium Tax Credit, HEALTH
CARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/lower-costs/save-on-monthly-premiums [https://perma.cc/
C9LJ-A3QV] [hereinafter How to Save]; see also Premium Tax Credits, OBAMACARE FACTS, 
http://obamacarefacts.com/insurance-exchange/premium-tax-credits/ [https://perma.cc/9B27-HS5R] 
(explaining “[i]f your income changes slightly, then the exact amount of assistance you get will 
too”). 
 290 How to Save, supra note 289; see also Premium Tax Credits, supra note 289 (advising 
subsidy recipients who are unsure of their exact amount of income not to take any of the credit in 
advance and to just wait for the benefit until tax time). 
 291 How to Save, supra note 289 (“It’s very important to report income and household changes 
to the Marketplace as soon as possible.”); see also Premium Tax Credits, supra note 289 (stressing 
the importance of reporting life changes to the marketplace). 
 292 Tom Howell, Jr., No Free Ride: Two-Thirds of Obamacare Recipients Had to Repay Sub-
sidies to IRS, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/
27/66-pct-obamacare-customers-paid-back-subsidies-irs [https://perma.cc/G98G-XA87]. 
 293 E.g., Jack Hadley & John Holahan, Is Health Care Spending Higher Under Medicaid or 
Private Insurance?, 40 INQUIRY 323, 333 (2003). 
 294 CMS recently issued a report showing that qualified health plans in the exchanges are 
more costly than public plans. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CERTIFICATION OF 
COMPARABILITY OF PEDIATRIC COVERAGE OFFERED BY QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS 3 (2015), 
http://www.medicaid.gov/chip/downloads/certification-of-comparability-of-pediatric-coverage-
offered-by-qualified-health-plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAU6-8ZB7] (finding that the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program, which is tied to Medicaid in many states, offers more comprehensive 
insurance coverage at lower out of pocket cost than qualified health plans in any state). See gener-
ally Leighton Ku & Matthew Broaddus, Public and Private Health Insurance: Stacking Up the 
Costs, 27 HEALTH AFF. w318 (2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/4/w318.full.pdf+
html [https://perma.cc/ETV6-VWFK] (reporting higher costs for private insurance than Medicaid 
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dleman of employers into private insurance, and because Medicaid simply 
pays providers less than private insurance; but it is also due to private-
insurance-specific factors, such as high pay for executives, marketing costs, 
concerns about shareholder profits, and administrative costs and waste in 
refusing and delaying payment. Thus, pushing all low-income Americans 
into private insurance could result in higher health care costs due to an ex-
tension of the higher costs of private insurance. 
B. Medicaid-Based Unified System 
Building on the universality embraced by the ACA, Medicaid could 
cover everyone up to 250% of the FPL, with no other qualifying character-
istics. Like the all-subsidy approach, this model contains positive and nega-
tive implications from a variety of viewpoints, including possible influence 
on health care fragmentation, personal and programmatic stigma, access to 
care, administrative matters, cost control, and implications for universality. 
From a theoretical perspective, an all-Medicaid system would avoid 
self-reliance scrutiny and destigmatize recipients of government assistance. 
The ACA adopted a principle of universality,295 a key change for a previously 
exclusionary system.296 This effort is arguably most evident in Medicaid.297 
Because the ACA’s principle of universality rendered Medicaid a social in-
surance program, rather than a welfare program, this section briefly consid-
ers the statutory implications of the ACA as enacted (rather than as judicial-
ly interpreted). If the ACA were implemented as enacted, every state would 
cover all of the nation’s poor earning up to 138% of the FPL, regardless of 
work status, parenting status, or other proxy for self-reliance. As enacted, 
the ACA ensured that the poor would not be excluded from health insurance 
because they could not afford it, whether or not they are currently working. 
As enacted, the ACA rejected states’ path dependence in welfare policies—
                                                                                                                           
and CHIP); Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Honorable Charles B. 
Rangel, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways & Means (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/costestimate/hr3962rangel0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R75-
XHQ3] (analyzing the proposed public health insurance option as administratively cheaper than 
private insurance, but not necessarily cheaper than private insurance overall depending on whether 
the payment rates compete with private insurance). 
 295 See generally Roberts & Huberfeld, Empirical, supra note 10 (exploring the principle of 
universality in Medicaid); Roberts & Huberfeld, Great Society, supra note 10 (same). 
 296 See generally Huberfeld, supra note 9 (exploring the principle of universality in Medi-
caid). 
 297 See supra notes 37–72 and accompanying text (examining self-reliance scrutiny and stig-
ma against Medicaid recipients under current scheme). See generally Roberts & Huberfeld, Em-
pirical, supra note 10 (exploring the principle of universality in Medicaid); Roberts & Huberfeld, 
Great Society, supra note 10 (same). 
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policies which have often been punitive in nature and have facilitated ex-
clusion in health care access in many states. As enacted, the ACA strength-
ened Medicaid’s universality by increasing payments to primary care physi-
cians for 2013–14, which was designed to encourage better physician up-
take of the newly eligible population.298 And, as enacted, the Medicaid popu-
lation would already be one quarter of the U.S. population at any given mo-
ment, further facilitating the ACA’s destigmatizing effects through the princi-
ple of universality. 
Instead, NFIB continues to thwart low-income Americans intended to be 
protected by the principle of universality from being fully de-stigmatized. 
Though King would have been disastrous for people relying on tax subsi-
dies if the Court had held for the law’s challengers, NFIB has done more 
than frustrate unified implementation of the Medicaid expansion—it has 
allowed states to reintroduce self-reliance scrutiny into Medicaid. The Obama 
Administration is negotiating with states in a conciliatory fashion to ensure 
that expansion and enrollment occur; their current goal is policy entrench-
ment. As these expansion negotiations continue, NFIB has made it so that 
the myth of self-reliance can be reintroduced into health care through en-
forceable cost-sharing requirements, job training, work search,299 and relat-
ed “self-reliance” requirements.300 HHS rejects such state-imposed self-
reliance myths, as they are unrelated to the Medicaid Act’s goal of provid-
ing “medical assistance,” but state legislators have been finding ways to 
link state-based work search requirements to state-run welfare programs as 
side-along requirements for Medicaid expansion.301 
                                                                                                                           
 298 Health Care Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1202, 124 
Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 20, 26, 42 (2012)). 
 299 See, e.g., Eric Whitney, Wittich Suspicious of Montana Medicaid Expansion Waiver Ap-
plication, MONT. PUB. RADIO (Aug. 17, 2015), http://mtpr.org/post/wittich-suspicious-montana-
medicaid-expansion-waiver-application [https://perma.cc/9ZVA-UYP4] (discussing Montana’s 
waiver application). The article conveys, regarding Montana’s Medicaid expansion waiver negoti-
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Representative Art Wittich, a Belgrade Republican, says the state’s draft waiver ap-
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Id. 
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state-based work-search requirements that could interfere with other welfare benefits if not ful-
filled. See UNINSURED ADULTS, supra note 72, at 2. 
 301 See Corey Davis, Medicaid Expansion Work Requirements, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM 
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/search-publications/Medicaid-expansion-
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If Medicaid covered everyone up to 250% of the FPL, these non-health 
care related requirements would be revealed as ideology rather than mean-
ingful health policy. As discussed above, people falling into the category of 
the penultimate poor who qualify for Medicaid but cannot enroll because 
they live in non-expansion states are largely workers.302 And those unin-
sured before the ACA was enacted were primarily workers.303 Work re-
quirements would be meaningless for people already working and would be 
revealed as political grandstanding if Medicaid eligibility increased to earn-
ings of 250% of the FPL. 
Moreover, just by covering low-income families at up to 138% of the 
FPL, which in 2015 was about $16,245 per year for a single person, Medi-
caid is estimated to cover 25% of the U.S. population upon full implementa-
tion of Medicaid expansion.304 A program that commonplace, through pure 
numbers, could defeat the stigma traditionally associated with it on both per-
sonal and programmatic dimensions—especially if 138% were raised to 
250% of the FPL.305 In fact, some managed-care companies that serve Medi-
caid beneficiaries are already using marketing language like “treat yourself” 
to Medicaid, a signal that universality makes the program more desirable.306 
Additionally, from a personal stigma perspective, Medicaid beneficiaries 
would no longer be “other”—the status of using Medicaid for health insur-
ance would be the norm, rather than relegated to maternity wards, nursing 
homes, and a limited range of other health care providers.307 This personal 
destigmatization could strengthen programmatic reputation, as Medicaid 
                                                                                                                           
work [https://perma.cc/CW9C-7JWW] (explaining why states will be unable to impose such work 
requirements). 
 302 See supra notes 188–269 and accompanying text (examining and dismissing popular no-
tions that those receiving public assistance do not engage in work). 
 303 See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid and National Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2009, 2010 (2009). 
 304 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 61, at 58 (“By 2024, about 89 million people will be 
enrolled in Medicaid at some time during the year.”). Medicaid already covers 22% of the popula-
tion. Total Monthly Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2015), http://kff.
org/health-reform/state-indicator/total-monthly-medicaid-and-chip-enrollment [https://perma.cc/
5W49-8Z58]. 
 305 See generally Heidi Allen et al., The Role of Stigma in Access to Health Care for the Poor, 
92 MILBANK Q. 289 (2014) (studying and discussing the role of stigma for low-income patients). 
 306 For example, Passport Health Plan in Kentucky used this language in newspaper and bill-
board advertisements to encourage enrollment when Kentucky expanded Medicaid eligibility. See 





 307 See Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 69 (discussing value of expanding Medicaid beyond cer-
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beneficiaries would be in every part of the health care system, forcing the 
program itself to stop behaving like Medicare’s stunted sibling. This univer-
sality would underline Medicaid’s new role as social insurance rather than 
welfare medicine, which in turn could have a halo effect on other welfare-
related programs and populations. 
Beyond the potential to destigmatize, raising the eligibility level to 
earnings of 250% of the FPL would be prudent policy for a number of rea-
sons. Current data regarding purchasers of health insurance through state 
and federal exchanges indicate that the 250% line would capture most fami-
lies that receive substantial tax subsidies and assistance with cost-sharing.308 
Moving enrollment from hidden to visible government assistance would 
place low-income individuals and families in a public program that has 
fewer out-of-pocket expenses.309 
                                                                                                                           
 308 In 2015, about 11.7 million people “selected” qualified health plans, and 10.2 million 
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Raising the eligibility level could also unite families that have dispar-
ate policies, which complicates health care access and cost. The following 
situation, for example, is not uncommon for low-income families: the mother 
is on Medicaid when she’s pregnant, her spouse is receiving subsidies to 
purchase an individual policy on an exchange, and their child is enrolled in 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program. Such families experience individ-
ual fragmentation within our already highly fragmented health care sys-
tem.310 Fragmentation encompasses disconnection along the vectors of both 
access to and continuity of care. When each family member has a different 
type of insurance with different types of accompanying benefits, accessing 
the health care system becomes even more complex and daunting.311 Unifi-
cation through raising Medicaid eligibility to 250% of the FPL could com-
bat both individual and systemic fragmentation, improving care and simpli-
fying families’ financial and health care needs.312 
In terms of administrative simplification, Medicaid eligibility up to 
250% of FPL could create a floor of federal standards that is less state-
deferential than the rules for qualified health plans in the exchanges. Though 
states have flexibility in creating benchmark equivalent coverage for the new-
ly eligible Medicaid population under the ACA, the benchmark coverage ar-
guably is more consistent from state to state than the private insurance availa-
ble on the exchanges.313 Further, staffing could be streamlined, eliminating 
the need for navigators and others who facilitate insurance enrollment 
through exchanges. More generous open enrollment and more consistent en-
rollment and payment policy for Medicaid could simplify not only admin-
istration of health insurance generally, but also such common individual life 
events as moving to another state for a job or adding a family member. 
On the other hand, despite federally uniform standards, Medicaid has 
fifty-six different versions; each state, territory, and the District of Columbia 
can exercise options available in the Medicaid Act, which complicates the ad-
ministration of Medicaid as compared to a totally federal program like Medi-
                                                                                                                           
caid. See Ku & Broaddus, supra note 294, at w322–25 (comparing Medicaid to private insurance 
costs and finding that Medicaid has significantly lower out-of-pocket costs and costs less per in-
sured). 
 310 See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra note 70 (exploring the 
fragmented nature of the health care system in the United States). 
 311 Organizations like Texas-based Community Health Choice attempt to provide an ad hoc 
solution for this fragmentation for low-income families by offering plan management across the 
various programs. See About Us, CMTY. HEALTH CHOICE, https://www.communitycares.com/en-
us/About-Us [https://perma.cc/S47E-MT2R]. 
 312 See generally Huberfeld, supra note 9 (discussing the de-fragmenting effect universality 
should have on health care generally). 
 313 See ACA § 2001, 124 Stat. at 271–79 (regarding benchmark coverage for the newly eligi-
ble Medicaid population). 
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care. This federal-state partnership can encourage experimentation that spurs 
improved enrollment or better care, but the argument for “innovation” is 
overshadowed by the fact that no clearinghouse exists for processing or ana-
lyzing state experimentation and its results. Though the federalism relation-
ships in Medicaid may be confounding, Medicaid’s various state-based incar-
nations are no more complicated than tax subsidies that are dependent on the 
federal tax system combined with state-based models. 
In terms of economic implications, Medicaid historically has been in-
expensive—by American health care standards—on a per capita basis as 
well as in administrative costs.314 This may seem counterintuitive given the 
large share of state budgets that Medicaid occupies (typically the second-
largest budget item, behind education). Medicaid’s relatively low costs stem 
from various factors, including a small administrative agency staff relative 
to the size of the program, sharing costs with states, and paying participat-
ing providers less than private insurance or Medicare.315 The low payment 
of health care providers in Medicaid has been the subject of much litigation, 
recently shut down by the Supreme Court.316 One of the authors has written 
elsewhere about the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Armstrong v. Excep-
tional Child Center, Inc. and next steps for ensuring sufficient payment for 
Medicaid providers.317 Fair payment in Medicaid certainly factors into pro-
vider willingness to see Medicaid patients, and states have proven that their 
need to balance budgets on the back of Medicaid providers makes HHS’s 
role in overseeing payment rates crucial. But, although some states have 
been slow to pay in times of budget crises, Medicaid generally does not en-
gage in the same slow-pay or no-pay games that private insurers have used. 
Further, Medicaid carries neither the executive compensation nor marketing 
expenses that private insurers claim are essential to their operations.318 
Unifying insurance coverage through Medicaid for everyone earning 
up to 250% FPL could also reduce churn, as people earning less than 250% 
of FPL are the most likely to experience income fluctuation and thus dis-
continuity of insurance coverage.319 Health policy experts have suggested 
                                                                                                                           
 314 See Ku & Broaddus, supra note 294, at w323; Rosenbaum, supra note 303, at 2010–11. 
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other measures to help reduce churn, such as data collection regarding dis-
enrollment and other enrollment-related information; twelve-month eligibil-
ity rather than monthly determinations in Medicaid; use of premium assis-
tance to help Medicaid beneficiaries purchase private insurance in exchang-
es so they can stay in one plan regardless of the source of payment; and use 
of the ACA’s Basic Health Program option.320 Although these measures are 
likely to mitigate churn in the context of the existing statutory structure, 
raising Medicaid eligibility could have even greater impact in reducing in-
terruptions in care and coverage that now occur because of churn. 
In summary, this Part demonstrates that a unified system of govern-
ment assistance for the poor has both theoretical and real-world benefits. An 
all-subsidy government program for the poor could avoid the dependency 
stigma and self-reliance scrutiny frequently attached to visible government 
benefits like Medicaid, facilitating greater enrollment and perhaps greater 
access to health care providers than Medicaid beneficiaries typically experi-
ence. From a cost perspective, a subsidy-based system that operates on a slid-
ing scale also may offer some economic nimbleness, ideally ensuring that 
people in need receive the right amount of support from the government 
while avoiding waste. Although the low-income subsidy avoids the pitfalls of 
self-reliance scrutiny, it does nothing to nullify the underlying beliefs. Con-
sequently, aid recipients might escape negative stereotyping in the health 
insurance context but still be subject to dependency stigma in other areas. 
Further, tax subsidies are a clunky mechanism for redistributing wealth for 
health insurance coverage, and private insurance has been shown to be more 
administratively costly than public insurance. 
On the other hand, an all-Medicaid program that raises eligibility to 
250% of FPL reduces health care fragmentation for both families and the sys-
tem as a whole. The sheer number of people covered and their ubiquity in the 
health care system, in contrast to their current limited visibility, would reduce 
personal and programmatic stigmatization. Further, all-Medicaid would likely 
simplify administrative matters, and relatedly would likely result in lower 
costs of care, as Medicaid is historically a less expensive mechanism for 
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providing medical care. Finally, the principle of universality is better fulfilled, 
in all of its dimensions, through this approach. 
CONCLUSION 
In the United States, government assistance in health insurance takes 
two primary forms: visible direct benefits and hidden tax subsidies. When 
Congress enacted the ACA, it perpetuated this divided system by creating 
bifurcated support for poorer Americans through (1) the low-income subsi-
dy and (2) the expanded Medicaid program. Yet, although the low-income 
subsidy survived its legal challenge in June 2015, the Supreme Court effec-
tively gutted the Medicaid expansion in an earlier decision. Likewise, poli-
ticians have expressed disdain and reluctance for visible benefits for low-
income Americans, while remaining relatively silent on this issue of hidden 
ones. 
The disparate treatment of these two substantively similar programs 
mirrors the self-reliance versus dependency and private versus public di-
chotomies that are so entrenched in American mythos. Medicaid recipients 
are subject to self-reliance scrutiny, with society labeling them as undesira-
ble dependents. Self-reliance, though, is a myth, both in general and in the 
context of health care. This Article reveals that the line between visible and 
hidden government assistance is unprincipled and incurs financial and ad-
ministrative costs. This Article therefore explores dismantling the current 
divided system in favor of a unified program designed to provide a more 
unified mechanism of health insurance to low-income individuals and fami-
lies. 
The authors hope that this proposal will have meaningful social and 
practical impact. By attacking the American myth of self-reliance, this Arti-
cle demonstrates that society is not divided between lazy dependents and 
good citizens, but rather that all Americans could at some point find them-
selves in need of government assistance. Whereas for its first forty-nine 
years, Medicaid only covered roughly 40% of the poor, the program now 
touches nearly every American life.321 Due to the ACA, an estimated 25% of 
the population will benefit from Medicaid’s health care coverage.322 Thus, if 
an individual is not on Medicaid, chances are a friend, family member, co-
worker, or employee is.  Likewise, the low-income subsidy is an essential 
aspect of health care reform, helping at least ten million individuals pur-
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chase coverage to obtain policies on the state exchanges in 2014.323 The 
subsidy redistributes income via health insurance policies funded with tax 
credits to individuals in financial need.324 Revealing that the dividing line 
between Medicaid and the low-income subsidies is theoretically unprinci-
pled calls into question the bifurcated government assistance that reflects it. 
After all, missing just one day’s work is enough to bounce a person from 
visible to hidden government assistance. 
Moreover, by arguing for a unified system, we hope to streamline 
health insurance for lower-income Americans, making government assis-
tance both simpler and less costly. As people bounce back and forth be-
tween Medicaid and subsidized private insurance, it costs both those indi-
viduals and the government time and money. A single system, whether 
based in Medicaid or on subsidies, would therefore be more efficient. 
Given the fraught legal battles surrounding the ACA for the past five 
years, Congress may not revisit the issue of providing health insurance to the 
poor in the near future. Nevertheless, when it does, lawmakers should consid-
er dismantling the falsely divisive private versus public system of government 
assistance in favor of a more inclusive and more efficient unified program. 
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